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Long Island Sound is a magnificent estuary,' stretching over 110 
miles from the windy eastern stretches of water and sand at its junc- 
tion with the Atlantic Ocean, to its western end where it meets 
Manhattan's East River amidst one of the nation's most urbanized 
areas.* Draining a watershed of 16,000 square miles reaching 
* Associate Professor of Law, Center for Environmental Legal Studies, Pace University 
School of Law. The author would like to thank the numerous individuals who provided 
comments and encouragement Special thanks must go to Professors ~ e f f r e ~  Miller, Nicholas 
Robinson and David Wooley for their wise counsel and generous support, and to research 
assistants, Eric Andreas and Andrew Provence, for their hard work and good cheer. The 
trading analysis especially benefited from Andrew's creative conuibutions. 
1. An estuary is a semienclosed body of water where fresh and saltwater mix. See JOHN A. 
KNAUSS, INTRODU~ION TO P ~ I W  OCEANOGRAPHY 38 (1978). 'Estuary" and 'estuarine 
zone" are also defined specifically in the Clean Water Act. &Clean Water Act Q 104(n) (4), 
33 U.S.C. 1254(n) (4) ("estuary' means all or pan of. .. the connection with open sea and 
within which the sea water is measurably diluted with fresh water derived from land drain- 
age"); Clean Water Act § 320(k). 33 U.S.C. § 1330(k) ('estuarine zone' includes 'associated 
aquatic ecosystems and those portions of tributaries draining into the estuary up to the h i s  
toric height of migration of anadromous fish or  the historic head of tidal influence, which- 
ever is higher"). 
2. &LONG ISLAND SOU- STUDY [hereinafter LISS] , COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION A D 
MANAGE MEN^ 1 (1994) [hereinafter CCMP]. Long Island Sound is bordered by Con- 
necticut and New York, but its,watershed encompasses all of Connecticut, those pans of New 
York lying near the Sound, as well as substantial portions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire 
and Vermont. It reaches into Canada, where the headwaters of the Connecticut River lie. 
For practical and managerial reasons, efforts to restore Long Island Sound focus on the wa- 
tershed within Connecticut and New York. See id at 1. 
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northward to Canada, with a population of almost eight and a half 
million it is home to a great diversity of plants, animals 
and fish.' With an estimated annual value exceeding $5 billion 
from commercial and recreational fishing, beach swimming and 
boating: the Sound provides jobs and recreation, and solace to the 
soul.6 Beneath the surface beauty, however, troubles abound. Fish 
catches are down, species diversity continues to decline and the wa- 
ters are often unappealing, and occasionally unsafe.' 
Of the numerous pollution problems facing Long Island Sound, 
the most prominent is over-enrichment of its waters by excess ni- 
trogen. That nitrogen derives from numerous sources, but primar- 
ily from sewage treatment plants which dot the Sound's shores and 
tributaries. The cost of improved sewage treatment is dauntingly 
high for many of the localities, faced as they are with competing 
needs for scarce tax dollars. Those costs may vary with the age and 
condition of the individual treatment plant, and the benefits to be 
gained in improved water quality in the Sound as a whole may shift 
according to the location of the particular plant. These factors 
have led to the suggestion that pollutant trading among plants 
might potentially achieve water quality goals in a more cost effi- 
cient manner than a traditional regulato~y program alone. That 
has, in turn, engendered interest in establishing some .type of mar- 
ket based nitrogen trading program, focusing either on the Sound 
as a whole or on one of the states bordering it. 
Although some of the earliest literature directed at managing wa- 
ter bodies and their watershedsa explored market type trading: the 
3. CCMF', supra note 2, at 3. 
4. &CCMP, supra note 2, at 101-02; Elsa Brenner, L.I. Sound Still Shy a C k n  Bill of Ha& 
The N.Y. Times, July 7,1996, ~ ~ ~ ' ( ~ e s t c h e s t e r  weekly), at 1. 
5. CCMF', supra note 2, at 2. 
6. Economists speak more prosaically of the benefits of protecti~ig and presexving a re- 
source such as the Sound, evaluating such elements as recreation, commercial fishing, 
"option value", and 'existence value." The option d u e  is'the value to an individual of pre- 
serving the option of using the resource in the future. The "existence value" encompasses 
all nonuse-related values; it is the amount a person would be willing to pay for water quality 
improvements even though the person does not anticipate ever using the resource. &Alan 
J. Krupnick, ReducingBay Nuhienb: An EconumicPenpcti~ 47 MD. L. REV. 452,457 (1988). 
' 7. For example, a series of sewage spills in June 1997 led health officials to dose twenty 
six.beaches in Westchester County, W, as well as beaches in the Bronx and Connecticut 
Spilled Scwngc Clarcs h h c s  in WcsIthcsln; N.Y. TIMU, June 18,1997, at BS; John T. McQuis- 
ton, More Beach are C l a d  by Scwagc, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997, at B4, Michael Cooper, Snu 
ogc Spill Ban Swimming at 27Benches. N.Y. nMES.June 29.1997, at 1/23. 
8. A watershed or drainage basin is the land mass which drains into a stream, river, lake, 
estuary or other body of water. For a discussion of the various terms see Robert W. Mler, 
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device has been primarily employed in dealing with air pollution 
under the federal Clean Air Act, most notably the sulfur dioxide 
trading program mandated by the Clean Air Act to reduce acid 
deposition.'0 However, not all observers are supportive of such 
market experiments. 
Scholars, advocates and agencies have for some time debated the 
efficacy and utility of market based incentives for pollution con- 
trol." In one comer are those, often economists, who contend that 
market instruments, rather than regulation, are the most efficient 
way to prevent environmental damage and restore degraded re- 
sources.'* They point particularly to the acid deposition program 
as a model for employing pollution trading to achieve environ- 
mental ends in a cost effective manner. In the other comer are 
those, including many environmentalists, who believe that market 
solutions, particularly pollution trading, achieve little, are overly 
complex to administer and enforce, and fail to reduce pollution 
where most needed; they often view the monetization of the right 
to pollute as an abdication of environmental principles.'3 They 
Addressing Banim to Watmhed Aotcctirm, 25 ENVTL. L. 973,976 & n.7 (1995), and references 
cited therein. 
9. Sec MARC J. ROBERTS, River Basin Authorities: A National Soluiion to Water Pollution, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 1527 (1970). 
10. Sec Clean Air Act §§ 410416, 42 U.S.C. $5 76511-76510 (1994). The add deposition 
program is discussed in Pan 11, C, 5, infia. 
11. Market based environmental policies are those which depend on financial incentives, 
or disincentives, to achieve desired environmental goals. They may include such mecha- 
nisms as fees, subsidies, and marketable rights. Sec OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND 
EVALUATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTE~ION AGENCY, 21 P-200 1, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES: 
OPTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION, 1-2-14 (1991). For a general discussion of 
regulatory and market mechanisms from which policy makers can choose for implementing 
environmental policies, sec ROBERT W. HAHN, A PRIMER ON ENVIRONMENTAL PO ICY DESIGN 
412 (1989); OFFICE OF TECHNOW ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Tools (1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PO ICYTOOLS]. 
12. Sec, e.6, Bruce k Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart. Refming Envimnmmtal Law: The 
D-atic CUM for Ma& Incmtivcr, 13 COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) [hereinafter Acker- 
man & Stewart 19881; Bruce k Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Rcfming Environmental 
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart 19851. Sec ako infia 
note 56. 
13. There are dear philosophical differences which stem from divergent views of ecologi- 
cal resources and pollution. Stated in extreme terms, one view sees nature as a resource to 
be exploited, and to the extent it can be polluted without obvious harm then it is to man's 
economic advantage to d o  so. Trading rights to pollute is simply an extension of this view. 
Scc Robert W. Hahn, Economic Am'pt ions  for Environmental Problem: How the P a t k t  Followed 
rhc Doctor> Ordm, J .  OF ECON. P E R s P E ~  95, 110 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn, Doctor's Or- 
dcn] (industry believes its claims on environmental resources represent property rights). 
The contrary view sees nature as good and pollution as bad. The suggestion that one might 
Heinonline - -  23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 140 1998 
19981 Reducing Nitrogen Pollution 141 
criticize the trading programs, including the acid deposition pro- 
gram, arguing that the same degree of pollution reduction might 
have been achieved using traditional regulatory controls," and that 
the trading system fails to protect the vulnerable populations and 
ecosystems and may delay full compliance with regulatory goals.15 
Still, the acid deposition trading program has encouraged mar- 
ket advocates to explore the applicability of pollution trading pro- 
grams to water pollution, land use and even climate change prob- 
lems.16 Trading programs already have been undertaken to control 
purchase rights to pollute raises serious moral concerns. S~RJCHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING 
AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA'S BUBBLE 9-10 (1986) 
[hereinafter LIROFF, TOIL & TROUBLE]; Michael J. Sandel, It's Immmal to Buy the Right to Pod 
lute, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23; James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional 
Gui&lincsfm Designing Sucussful Transfmable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369,370 & n.4 
(1989); Adam J. Rosenberg, Emissions Credit Futura Contracts on the Chitogo Board of Trodc: 
Rcgonal and Rational GWknges to the Rzght to Pollute, 13 VA. EWL. L.J. 501,52526 & n.158 
(1994); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alrcnurtive to M y ,  Fire, A i m  A New Framnuork to L i d  
Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803,856-858 & nn.230-231 (1997). Sce 
ako Jane B. Baron &Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market R n t i d Q :  Moral Cntigucc of Econmnic 
Ana4si.s in +l T h q ,  17 Cardozo L. Rev. 431, 436-437 (1996) (environmental ethics hos- 
tile to economic analysis); Hahn, Doclor's Ordm, supra note 13, at 111 (environmentalists fear 
that market alternatives will give legitimacy to polluting). While most individuals' views fall 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, the moral overtones often enter into the debate. 
.See Marshall J. Breger, Richard B. Stewart, E. Donald Elliott, David Hawkins, Rwiding Ew- 
nomic Incmtivcs in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 46470, 480 (1991) 
(speeches before the Administrative Conference of the U.S.) [hereinafter Breger et aL, J+o- 
vidingEconomic Incmtiva] (dangerous to put in place any system that created legal rights to a 
given level of pollution; the issue does not revolve around rights to pollute, but temporuy 
permission; D. Hawkins) (regulation is also a license to pollute, for free; R Stewart). 
14. Sec David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Econmnic Incenlive Aogram?: Rqlan'ng the 
Command and Control/Ecaomic Incmtive Didrotmny, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 
1998) (manuscript on file with the author). Professor Driesen suggests that the term 
'economic incentive" is poorly defined, but often is conuasted with traditional regulatory 
measures, ignoring the fact that such measures themselves often create strong economic 
incentives. This leads critics to exaggerate the disadvantages of traditional regulation and 
minimize its advantages. 
15. Sw James Dao, A New, Unregulated Madel: Selling the Rqht to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 
1993, at Al. Opponents of trading may also point to the potential for uneven distribution of 
pollution impacts and the concomitant issue of environmental justice. See EPA Weigh Envi- 
ronmental Jurtim Impactr ofEmissions Trading Aograms, INSIDE PA, Sept 5,1997, (Weekly Re- 
port), at 20 (community group contendsaading program violates Civil Rights Act by d i s  
proportionately impacting disadvantaged communities); Eileen Gauna, Federal 
Envinmmenhl Citixen Aovirimrc: Obstacles and Incmtiva on the Ruad to Environmerital Justice, 22 
EC0ux;vL.Q. 1,72 (1995) (trading programs may lead to 'hot spots" in poor and minority 
communities); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution. Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENCIZ. L.J. 300. 
343 (1995) (distributional problems arise if pollution tnding programs do not assure mean- 
ingful citizen participation). Sce also LIROW, TOIL & TROUBLE, supra note 13, at 10; 
16. Trading on a global scale currently is being suggested by the Administration as a 
mechanism for addressing carbon dioxide and other emissions which contribute to global 
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water pollution in specific water bodies," both from point source 
dischargers and from overland runoff, or nonpoint s~urces. '~ 
These programs have sometimes been controversial, but interest in 
trading remains strong at the federal level, and in some localities. 
This interest is stimulated in part by the growing recognition that 
some water quality problems can be addressed only on a large geo- 
graphic scale. A federal policy shift toward increasing emphasis on 
watershed management coincides with, and perhaps encourages, 
consideration of trading schemes. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the legal adequacy of 
proposals now under consideration for a nitrogen trading program 
on Long Island Sound, and to assess the likelihood of success in 
light of the experience with other trading programs, both for water 
and air pollution. Part I outlines the current environmental condi- 
tion of Long Island Sound and explains the factors which have led 
proponents of trading to believe such a program could be effective. 
In Part I1 we consider the essential elements of a trading program, 
and the lessons to be learned from the Clean Air Act programs. 
Part I11 examines the federal policy framework within which water 
pollutant trading may take place, while Part IV analyzes the legal 
framework and explains the ways by which a trading program may 
be crafted to fit within it. Part V reviews existing water trading pro- 
grams and the lessons to be learned from their successes and fail- 
ures. Part VI undertakes a rigorous analysis of the specific proposal 
under consideration for Long Island Sound, evaluating both its le- 
gal adequacy and the likelihood that a sufiicient market driver 
would be created to provide economically efficient environmental 
results. Part VII concludes that although a Long Island Sound pol- 
lutant trading program can be accommodated within the frarne- 
warming. See Peter Passell, Global Warming Plan Would Make Emissions a Cummodify, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at Dl; set aLso John H .  Cushman, Jr., Pollution Politics: Clintun's Choice 
N.Y. T ~ M E ~ ,  JUNE 27,1997, at A1 1; Peter Passell, Wanhd: A G h l  Warming Poky that Stands a 
Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,1997, at D2. 
17. Water pollutant trading may be referred to as effluent trading, water quality trading, 
or nutrient trading if that is the pollutant to be traded. Set Surface Water Quality Division, 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Introduction to Market-Based Program 1 3 
(visited Dec. 20, 1997) <http://www.deq.state.mi.us/swq/trading/htm/intro.htm> 
[hereinafter Introduction to Markef-Based Programs]. 
18. The term 'point source" is generally used to indicate a facility which discharges its 
waste through a pipe. 'Point source" is defined in Clean Water Act Section 502(14) as "any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.. . ." 33 U.S.C. 5 1362 (14) (1995) 
[hereinafter C.WA.1 The term "nonpoint source" is typically used when referring to uncon- 
trolled runoff. 
Heinonline - -  23 Colurn. J. Envtl. L. 142 1998 
19981 Reducing Nitrogen Pollution 143 
work of the Clean Water Act, the factual predicates for such a pro- 
gram have yet to be established, and practical and policy concerns 
make such a trading program problematic. 
A. The Hypoxia Problem 
The Long Island Sound Study (LISS) was begun in 1985 to ex- 
amine the water quality problems confronting the sound.Ig It fo- 
cused particularly on the low levels of dissolved oxygen (DO), a 
condition known as hypoxia, in parts of the Sound during the 
summer months. Its research identified excess nitrogen as the ma- 
jor cause of the low DO levels.*' Nitrogen, an nutrient essential for 
plant growth and survival, can disrupt the natural balance of a wa- 
ter body when present at high levels. It fuels the growth of algae 
which eventually die, sink to the bottom, and decompose. The de- 
composition process consumes oxygen, thereby reducing the 
amount available generally in the ambient water, depriving fish 
and other aquatic life of the oxygen critical to sustain them.21 One 
19. The Long Island Sound Study got underway as the result of a congressional appro- 
priation for EPA and the coastal states of Connecticut and New York to assess the water qual- 
ity of the Sound. CCMF', supra note 2, at 5. Following enactment of the Clean Water Act 
Amendments of 1987, Long Island Sound was selected to participate in the National Estuary 
.Program, and the Long Island Sound Study Management Conference, which included fed- 
eral, state and local officials, representatives of indusuy, public interest groups, and aca- 
demic institutions, Clean Water Act § 320 (c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1330(c), was charged with gather- 
ing data and assessing the condition of the estuary, identifying the causes of environmental 
problems, and developing a Comprehensive Consemtion and Management Plan to rec- 
ommend priority corrective actions and compliance schedules to address those problems. 
Clean Water Act 5 320 (b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1330 (b). 
20. LISS, H W ~ X ~ A  AND NUTRIENT ENRICHMENT-ASSESSMENT OF CONDT~IONS AND 
MANAGEMEW RECOMMENDATIONS iii (1993) (hereinafter HYPOXIA STUDY). Hypoxia is gen- 
erally considered to exist when dissolved oxygen levels dip below 3 mg/l, the level t h ~ ; ~ h t  
by biologists necessary to sustain healthy marine life. CCMF', supra note 2, at 11; LISS, H y  
poxia in Lung Island Sound, Table 1. 
21. In general, the maximum amount of dissolved oxygen which water can hold at typical 
summer water temperatures is 7.5 mg/l. HmXIA STUDY, supra note 20, at 1. The states 
have set water quality standards for dissolved oxygen at levels which are intended to protect 
aquatic organisms. Those standards are 5 mg/l in New York and 5 to 6 mg/l in ~onnecti-  
cut, depending on the type of waters involved. Id at 13. SecN.Y. COMP. CODESR & REGS. tit. 
6.5 703.3 (1991); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 111 (1996). Annual monitoring has shown levels 
as low as 0 mg/l (anoxia). In 1989 nearly 60% (over 500 square miles) of Sound bottom 
waten contained less than 3 mg/l. HWXIA SIZIDY. supra note 20. at 2. As recently as 1994. 
25 percent of the Sound had unhealthy levels of oxygen during the late summer. LISS, 
P R O P O ~  FOR PHASE I11 ACTIONS FOR HmXIA MANAGEMENT [hereinafter PWE 111 
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obvious manifestation of this problem is the fish kills which are not 
uncommon in some of the bays and harbors surrounding the 
sound: but hypoxia can have more subtle effects on the develop 
ment of marine organisms and on species composition.23 
Hypoxic conditions do not occur uniformly throughout the 
Sound, and tend to be most severe during the summer months in 
the western end of the Sound, which, not surprisingly, is the area 
of highest population concentration and sewage treatment plant 
loadings.24 While hypoxia has been recorded in the Sound over the 
decades, the evidence suggests that it is becoming more common 
and more severe.25 
The nitrogen flowing into the Sound comes from numerous 
sources, including fertilizer used on farm fields and urban lawns, 
26 
septic tanks, animal wastes, and even air pollution. However the 
primary contribution is from the more than one billion gallons a 
PROPOSAL] 5 & Fig. 3 (Aug. 1997). The Long Island Sound Comprehensive Conservation 
and Management Plan sets interim targets, with a minimum of 3 mg/l under cenain condi- 
tions. CCMP, supra note 2, at 26. 
22. CCMP, supra note 2, at 15. 
23. HYPOXIA STUDY, supra note 20, at 10. Hypoxia can be especially damaging for organ- 
isms, such as oysters, which cannot move to more oxygen enriched waters. Id. Hypoxia can 
also alter the ecological makeup of a waterbody, wiping out organisms sensitive to low oxy- 
gen levels, while allowing those types of organisms which can sustain themselves in such 
conditions to survive. Id 1 n  addition to hypokc conditions resulting from their decay, algae 
cloud the water, depriving submerged aquatic vegetation, so important to many species for 
food and habitat, of the light necessary for growth. Alliance for the Chesapeake, N m  Air 
Rules Expecfed to Help R e d m  Bay Nutrients, BAYJOURNAL, July-Aug., 1997, at 10. 
24. The hypoxia problem caused by excessive discharges of nitrogen is exacerbated by the 
natural tendency of the waterbody to stratify during the warmer summer months. The 
fresher water on the surface is warmer but contains more oxygen than the lower layer, which 
is denser and saltier. This phenomenon creates a density difference called a pycnocline. 
which prevents mixing of the surface and bottom layers which would otherwise occur and 
bring oxygen to the lower level. CCMP, supra note 2, at 1618; su infia note 313 and accom- 
panying text. 
25. CCMP, supra note 2, at 11. 
26. CCMP, supra note 2, at 20. Nitrogen compounds in the air result from emissions by a 
variety of sources, and are deposited to water bodies directly either as dry deposition, or  acid 
precipitation. They reach waters indirectly through runoff. Estimates on the amount of ni- 
trogen reaching the Sound through these mechanisms vary. The LISS estimates the figure 
at 11 percent. Phase I11 Proposal, supra note 21, at 5. A report released by the National Oce- 
anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in June 1996 contains an estimate of 20 per- 
cent. R VALICURA, W. LUKE, R ARTZ, B. HI-. COASTAL OCEAN PROGRAM, NATIONAL 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINLSlXATION, DECISION ANALYSIS SWES NO. 9, ATMOSPHERIC 
NUTRIENT INPUT TO COASTAL AREAS: REDUCING THE UNCERTAINTF.~ 17 (1996). Sec ako Of- 
fice of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA- 
453/R-97-011, Deposition of Air Pollutants to the Great Waters: Second Report to Congress, 
168,17374 (1997) (total load from atmospheric deposition is 20 percent). 
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day of treated effluent discharged by over 60 sewage treatment 
plants located on or close to the ~ o u n d . ~  Indeed, more than half 
of the total load of nitrogen delivered to Long Island Sound as a 
result of human activities is from these plants.28 These discharges, 
as well as other point and nonpoint loadings of nitrogen have in- 
creased over the years, and will likely continue to do so.'' 
B. Addressing the Problem 
Sewage treatment plants are required under the Clean Water Act 
to employ a specific level of treatment referred to as "secondaly 
treatment,"g0 and even more stringent controls if necessary to pre- 
vent the impairment of local waters." Although some incidental 
nitrogen removal occurs during normal operations, most plants are 
not designed to remove significant levels of this pollutant. Achiev- 
ing high levels of nitrogen removal requires construction of new 
facilities or costly upgrades of old ones. Even with new technology 
based on biological the costs are s~bstantial.~~ 
The Long Island Sound Management Conference, a partnership 
27. CCMP, supra note 2, at 4; LISS, SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION A D 
M A N A G ~ E N T  F U N ,  at 6 (1994) [hereinafter CCMP SUMMARY]. 
28. CCMP, supra note 2, at 20. The most recent figures indicate that point sources, pri- 
marily sewage treatment plants, account for 37,000 tons of nitrogen a year. PHASE I11 
PROPOSALS, supra note 21, at 5. 
29. Nonpoint sources conmbute substantially less nitrogen to the Sound than point 
sources, -roughly twenty percent CCMP, supra note 2, at 20. Because of their diffuse na- 
ture it is often difficult to monitor, measure and control their pollutant load. Additionally, 
they are almost unregulated under the Clean Water Act. Scc infia note 172. 
30. Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 131 1 (b) (1) (B). Sce infra note 179. 
31. Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311 (b) (1) (C). 
32. Nitrogen removal was traditionally achieved by using chemical additives. Biological 
methods for removing nutrients from wastewater (BNR) have improved the economic out- 
look, but still can be quite costly, and cannot always be employed. PHASE I11 PROPOSAL, supra 
note 21, at 6; sccCCMP, supra note 2, at 29. 
33. Preliminary estimates indicated that total maximum capital costs for a high level of 
nitrogen removal from point sources to the Sound could be as much as $8.1 billion, $6.4 
billion for New York and $1.7 billion for Connecticut. CCMP, supra note 2, at 158. The 
most recent cost estimate for maximum nitrogen removal at the 70 treatment plants in New 
York and Connecticut is about $2.5 billion. PHASE I11 PROPOSAL, supra note 21, at 14. Scc 
ah0 AT. KEARNEY, INC., FRAMEWORK FOR INCORPORATING FLEXIBLE, MARKET-BASED IN- 
CENIWES INTO GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING OF N ~ O G E N  REDUCI'ION ACTIONS FOR LONG ISLAND 
SOUND, DRAFT FINAL 1-6 (August 27, 1996) [hereinafter AT. KW\RNEY, INC.], [prepared for 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 11] (estimates are in the $2 to 3 billion 
range). It should be noted, however, that these estimates reflect the total cost of plant u p  
grades, and not just the incremental costs of adding nitrogen removal. Incremental costs 
have recently been estimated at $300 million for New York and $350 million for Connecti- 
cut. PHASE I11 PROPOSAL, supra note 21, at 14. 
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of the federal government and the states of Connecticut and New 
York which was established by Congress to oversee the Long Island 
Sound Study and to develop a Comprehensive Management plan", 
issued its Plan in 1994.'~ In it, the Conference chose both interim 
and long term goals for dissolved oxygen levelss6 and set forth a 
phased implementation plan to manage hypoxia, focusing on sew- 
age treatment Phase I essentially called for a "freeze" on 
nitrogen loadings, setting 1990 as the baseline year. Phase I1 
consisted of a number of relatively low cost actions to achieve addi- 
tional reductions below 1990 levels. The Plan recognized that 
these steps would not meet the interim targets, let alone the overall 
goal for dissolved oxygen ands9 accordingly, Phase 111 called for ad- 
ditional reductions, with targets to be based on sophisticated com- 
puter modeling work. 
To carry out the Phase I11 reductions, the near Sound watershed 
was divided into geographical management zones, based primarily 
on tributary  watershed^.^' Nitrogen loadings in each zone and 
their impacts on the Sound were to be assessed based on the 
model, and zone-by-zone plans would be fashioned to achieve ni- 
trogen reduction targets,'" using both point and nonpoint source 
34. Set s u p  note 19. 
35. The Conference released the Management Plan in 1994; the principal problems it 
- - 
idendfied were (1) low lkvels of dissolved oxygen (hypoxia) in muchof the Sound, due in 
large pan to nitrogen from point sources, primarily sewage treatment plants; (2) toxic con- 
tamination; (3) contamination from pathogens; (4) floatable debris; (5) the impact of all 
these factors on living resources; (6) and the degradation of water quality and habitat due to 
land use and development. CCMP, supra note 2, at ES1. 
36. Id. at 25, 26 (Sidebar 5). The CCMP set interim DO targets both for the bottom wa- 
ters of the Sound where the greatest problems occur, and for surface waters. The intent of 
the targets is to eliminate severe hypoxia. Bottom targets are to maintain existing DO levels 
in those waters currently meeting state water quality standards; and raise DO levels to meet 
state standards in those areas having current DO levels between 3.5mg/l and the state stan- 
dards. For those areas which do not presently achieve a level of 3.5mg/l, the interim target 
is to increase levels to 3.5 mg/l, with an absolute floor of 1.5 mg/l at all times. Interim tar- 
gets were also established for surface waters. The long term is to "[ilncrease dissolved 
oxygen levels in the Sound to eliminate adverse impacts of hypoxia resulting from human 
activities." Id. at 25. 
37. Id. at 2745. 
38. The states agreed to achieve this 'freeze," through various permit modifications and 
facility retrofits. CCMP, supra note 2, at 27-29 
39. Id. at 36. 
40. The land area was classified into eleven "management" zones, corresponding largely 
to river system watersheds. The function and intent of these management zones and plans, 
and their significance to any proposed trading program, is discussed in Part VI, infia. 
41. CCMP, supra note 2, at 37. 
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controls.. But in light of the high point source loadings and the dif- 
ficulties inherent in reducing runoff: a substantial focus remained 
on limiting sewage plant discharges. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the report a new computer model, 
known as LIS 3.0, was completed for use in managing nitrogen 
loadings to the ~ound." Based on modeling work, it appears that 
to achieve targeted dissolved oxygen levels overall inputs of nitro- 
gen must be reduced 58.5 percent from 1990 levels. Accordingly, 
in Februaxy 1997 the LISS Management Conference's Policy 
committee4' released for public comment a "Proposal for Phase 3 
Actions for Hypoxia Management", which included a commitment 
by Connecticut and New York to reduce nitrogen loads by 58.5 
percent from 1990 levels by the year The proposal contem- 
plates a phased, enforceable schedule which is to achieve 40 per- 
cent progress toward the 58.5 percent goal in five years; 75 percent 
within ten years; and full attainment in 15 years.46 Each of the 
eleven watershed-based management zones established by the LISS 
was allocated the same 58.5 percent reduction." Within each man- 
agement zone loadings may be allocated to both point and non- 
point sources. 
42. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) nonpoint sources are 
today the largest cause of our Nation's water quality problems. O ~ C E  OF WATER, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTE~ION AGENCY, EPA A841-F-964044, NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION: 
THE NATION'S LARGFS WATER QUALITY PROBLEM, Pointer No. 1, (visited Dec. 20, 1997) 
<http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/pointl.htm>. These sources are extremely di- 
verse, set i d ,  and are harder to idennfy and control than point sources, depending as they do 
on localized features such as land uses, climate and geology. See David Letson, 
Point/Nmp0IPOInt Source Pollution Reduction Trading: An Inlnpretive Survey, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J .  
219 (1992). Monitoring and enforcement are-also mor; difficult for these diffuse sources. 
Id at 2. 
43. LIS 3.0 is a threedimensional(east-west, north-south, surface to bottom) time-variable 
model combining both the hydrodynamics of the Sound with water quality components. It 
uses tide and current measurements to simulate the water's circulation. HYDROQUAL, INC., 
WATER QUAL~Y MODELING ANALSIS OF HWXIA IN LONG ISLAND SOUND USING LIS 3.0 Uuly 
1996) (prepared for the Management Committee, Long Island Sound Estuary Study gnd 
New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission). 
44. The Policy Committee, which is composed of the Administrators of the U.S. Envi- 
ronmental Protection Agency's Regions I and 11, the New York State Commissioner of Envi- 
ronmental Consenation, and the Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 
has overall responsibility for the LISS. CCMP, supra note 2, at 5-6, and Figure 2. 
45. The states will propose Clean Water Act permit modifications and commit to neces- 
sary nonpoint source actions by August 1999; the nitrogen reduction targets are to be 
achieved 15 years after that date. LISS Policy Committee, Proposal for Phase 3 Actions for 
Hypoxia Management, February 7, 1997 [hereinafter Policy Committee Proposal]. 
46. Id. at 2. 
47. Id at 1. 
Heinonline - -  23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 4 7  1 9 9 8  
The Policy Committee further proposed to assure that its actions 
in administering and enforcing the nitrogen reduction targets 
would be consistent with the Clean Water Act by formally develop 
ing a total maximum daily load (TMDL) for nitrogen as required 
by the Act, including both point and nonpoint sources. Once a 
TMDL is established, the states will develop zone-by-zone plans to 
allocate the wasteload or wasteload reductions among dischargers." 
By 1999, wastewater discharge permits will be modified to reflect 
the allocations? and commitments made toward nonpoint reduc- 
tions by 1999. The Policy Committee's proposal was the subject of 
public meetings in the fall of 1997 and it was adopted in final form 
in February 1 9 9 ~ . ~ "  
In the meantime, interest has been expressed by Long Island 
Sound officials in the potential for employing market mechanisms, 
such as a point source nitrogen' trading program, to achieve the 
necessary reductions at the lowest overall cost. The Long Island 
Sound Study Management Conference released in August 1996 a 
Framework for Incorporating Flexible, Market-Based Incentives into Gee 
graphic Tawting of Nitrogen Reduction Actions for h g  Island Sound, 
Draft  ina ah^' The document analyzed the benefits and drawbacks of 
trading and recommended a specific "strawman" trading program 
for the Sound. In its February 1997 proposal, the Policy Commit- 
tee appointed an Ad Hoc Nitrogen Trading Discussion Group con- 
sisting of federal, state and local officials,  academic^,^' and envi- 
ronmental public interest representatives to review the issue and 
report by June 1998 regarding the feasibility of a nitrogen trading 
program. It is the proposal for trading on Long Island Sound that 
is the ultimate subject of this article, but to fully understand the is- 
sue some understanding of the basics of pollutant trading and its 
history is e~sential.~' 
48. The TMDL process is discussed in Pan IV, infia 
49. The proposal contemplates that NPDES permits will be modified to require plans for 
meeting the long-term limits, and to impose nitrogen loading limitations in accordance with 
the five-year target. Policy Committee Proposal, supra note 45, at 2. 
50. LISS Policy Committee Meeting Summary, Feb. 5, 1998, at 1; John T. McQuiston, 15- 
Year Plan Is Adopted To Clean L.I. Sound, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1998, at B4. In spite of the com- 
mitment to reducing hypoxia in the Sound demonstrated by the proposal, there remains a 
real likelihood that even if all scheduled reductions are achieved, the goal of substantially 
improved oxygen levels may remain elusive. &PHASE I11 PROPOSAL, supra note 21, at 9. 
51. AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33. 
52. The author is a committee participant 
53. For further information regarding Long Island Sound see Ann Powers and E1.i~ S. 
Andreas, h g  Island Sound: A Bibliography of Legal and Related Materials, 14 PACE ENVFL. L. 
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111. THE ELEMENTS OF A TRADING PROGRAM 
Pollutant trading is a market-based approach to environmental 
protection intended to take advantage of the differences in pollu- 
tion control costs confronting dischargers of the pollutant in ques- 
tion. The theory is to allow those dischargers that can achieve pol- 
lution reduction most cost effectively to sell or barter their excess 
pollutant reduction capabilities to other eligible dischargers for 
whom reducing their own pollutant loads is more costly. By this 
process, the more efficient pollution reduction sources profit fi- 
nancially, while the less efficient sources take the regulatory credit 
for the reductions." Trading seeks to inject a large degree of flexi- 
bility into a pollution control program by separating the issue of 
who will pay for the control from who will install it.55 In this man- 
ner it addresses the complaints of rigidity and inefficiency which 
arise in the traditional regulatory programs.56 
REV. 447 (1996). A full listing of federal environmental law statues and related authorities 
may be found on the Pace V i d  Environmental Law Libmy. Su Pace University School of 
Law, Center for Environmental Legal Studies, Global Environmental Law Neb& 
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/vell6.html>. 
54. Su Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incmtivc-Based Environmental Regulation: A 
N m  Era F m  an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGYL. Q. 1 , 8 9  (1991) [hereinafter Hahn & Stavins, Incm- 
tive Base-Environmental Regulation]; TOM TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN 
REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 16 (1985) [hereinafter TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING]; 
Paul Faeth, What is Trading? I 1 ,  in Summaly of Aesentaths, Water Quulib Trading Confmenu 
(Surface Water Quality Division, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality) (visited 
December 20, 1997) <http://www.deq.state.mi.us/swq/trading/htm/confsum.htm> 
[hereinafter Faeth, Whot is Tradingq. 
55. Su TOM RETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AM) NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 410 
(1992) . 
56. SugmeraQ, Ackerman & Stewart 1985, supra note 12; Breger et al., Providing Economic 
Incentives in Environmental Regulations, supra note 13; Richard B. Stewart, ModcLc/or Environ- 
mental Regulation: Cmtral Planning V .  Ma&-Based Approack, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
547, 554 (1992). The term "command-andcontrol" is often used, sometimes negatively, to 
describe traditional pollution control regulations which give specific directives to discharg- 
ers concerning the level of control to be achieved or the &pes of technology to be installed. 
Su Hahn & Stavins, Inccntivc-Baud Environmental Regulation, supra note 54, at 56. Professor 
Driesen argues that the term 'command and control" is usually used inaccurately to refer to 
regulatory measures which specify emission levels, notjust precise compliance methods. See 
Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Gnnmand and Con- 
trol/Economic IncentiveDichoknny, supra note 14, (manuscript at 9-12). Whatever its flaws, even 
those who criticize it as inefficient concede that a traditional regulatory approach may be 
preferable in certain situations, such as when pollutants have local impacts, or where the 
sources are too few to provide a competitive market. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 54, at 1 4  
15. In Hahn's and Stavins' view, the best set of pollution control policies will involve a mix 
of market mechanisms and traditional regulatory measures. Id at 15. Sec also infra note 180 
(discussing of technolowbased standards). 
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A. Market-Based Principles 
The goal of a pollutant trading program is to attain ecological 
objectives while effectively lowering overall discharge control costs. 
To attain this goal, trading programs must rely on the basic ele- 
ments found in every market: a commodity to be traded, a demand 
for the commodity, and a.structure in which, trading can occur.57 
In a pollutant trading scheme, pollution discharge units are the 
commodity that is traded. These units represent a defined amount 
of pollution expressed in'terms of kilog&s, pounds, or tons? and 
are typically referred to as credits or a l lo~ances .~~ Since the goal is 
to protect environmental resources, the tradable units must be real 
and quantifiable to assure that actual pollutant reductions are 
a~hieved.~' Once the trading program has been established, poten- 
tial cost savings are the primary economic incentive that will create 
demand. A discharger will be inclined to trade if the trade allows it 
to reduce its cost of pollution control, but if cost savings are un- 
available, trading is unlikely to o ~ c u r . ~ '  Generally, a discharger 
would have incentive to purchase units if it could thereby achieve 
the required pollution reduction at a price .below its own control 
costs. .On the other hand, a discharger would have incentive to sell 
if its control costs were low and it could profit by generating excess 
saleable pollution reduction units.62 Finally, the structure of a trad- 
ing program (the rules of the game or the trading guideline) is 
likely to be determined, especially inthe water pollution context, 
. , 
57. See Kurt Stephenson & Leonard Shabman (Virginia Water Resource Research Cen- 
ter), Efluent A h a n c e  Trading: A New Approach to Watmhed Management, WATER SCIENCE 
REPORTER 2 (National Institutes for Water Resources), Oct, 1996 [hereinafter WATER 
SCIENCE REPORTER]. 
58. See Introduction to Market-Based Programs, supra note 17, q 3. 
59. Whether these units are called credits or  allowances depends upon the nature of the 
trading program. See infia note 66. 
60. See Introduction to Market-Based Programs, supra note 17,q 3; Breger et al., Aoviding Ece 
nmnu Incentives, supra note 13, at 471. 
61. See O ~ C E  OF WATER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA 
800-R-96-001, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHEDBASED TRADING (1996) [hereinafter 
DRAFT W E W O R K ] .  Optimally, all sources would control to the same marginal cost level, 
that is, the additional o;incremental costs of achieving one additional unit of pollution re- 
duction would be equal. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 54, at 6 & n. 25. 
62. Sac Hahn & Stavins, supra note 54, at 6 & n. 25; TIETENBERG, EMWIONS TRADING, supra 
note 54, at 16; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Pmnits: Lcssmfo~ Thcoly and 
Pradice, 16 ECOL. L. Q. 361,364 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Mankctable Permits]; Es- 
ther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Troding: Looking Bqrofld Potential Casl Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 
43,5657 (1993) [hereinafter Bartfeld, Point-Nunpo1'nt Suurce Trading]. 
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through negotiations between the dischargers, government permit- 
ting authorities, and interested citizen groups.a 
B. Types of Markets 
One of the first considerations in establishing a trading program 
is to determine the type of "market" which will be created, since 
that will dictate how units of pollution reduction will be created 
and how new sources can gain entry into the market. Trading pro- 
grams are either structured as open or closed, and both can take 
place in an existing regulatory frarnew~rk.~ An "open" market 
program has no cap on the overall amount of pollution dis- 
charged, or limit on the number of pollution units which may be 
traded.65 A baseline generally is established by a regulatory pro- 
gram, and a source in the system creates saleable reduction units 
(credits)& by reducing discharge levels more than necessary to 
achieve its permitted baseline level. 67 The credits may be traded, 
used for compliance or banked. A source wishing to sell credits 
can do so after documenting that it has in fact reduced its dis- 
charge below the regulated mandated levels. The trading program 
is "open" to new sources, in that the only barrier into the market is 
compliance with the regulatory requirements, usually use of speci- 
fied technological controls or attainment of the performance level 
68 
which might be achieved using those controls. Accordingly, 
sources meeting these requirements do not need to purchase cred- 
its to begin operation.69 
Because open-market trading systems are based upon existing 
discharge limits without a cap, they may require little additional 
63. Sec WATER SCIENCE REPORTER, supra note 57, at 413. 
64. Scc Faeth, What ir Tmding?, supra note 54; Introductirm to Market-Based Program, supra 
note 17, 11 7-10. Virmally all uading programs rely on an existing permitting system. 
HAHN, supra note 11, at 50. 
65. One example of an open market type trading arrangement, the use of offsets under 
the Clean Air Act, is examined below in Pan 11. C. 3. 
66. These terms are often used interchangeably, but 'credits" tend to refer to the excess 
pollution units created in an open program by reductions below the baseline. 'Allowance" 
is the term usually used when referring to the pollution units allocated in a closed program. 
67. SccFaeth, What ir Trading?, supra note 54. The baseline for reduction for an open uad- 
ing program comes from the exishng regulatoly framework, 'such as existing te;hnology 
based standards expressed in individual discharge permit. 
67. See id 
68. Participation in the program is voluntary, without resuiction on the number of par- 
ticipants. 
69. &AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 2-9. 
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environmental information and monitoring, and permits need not 
generally be issued or altered. Thus, this type of program lends it- 
self to relatively prompt implementation. But because credits can 
be used by dischargers to meet the baseline requirements, there is 
substantial possibility for localized impacts, or "hot spots."70 
An "open" trading program is not really feasible for Long Island 
Sound, since the Clean Water Act requires any water body which is 
not meeting water quality standards (e.g., the Sound) to have a total 
limit on loadings as discussed in Part IV, A. However, understand- 
ing this type of market is necessary when reviewing other trading 
programs. 
Although open trading programs may have appeal because of 
their apparent flexibility, closed trading programs, generally re- 
ferred to as "cap and trade," are the most common. The acid 
deposition control provisions of the Clean Air Act are of this na- 
t ~ r e , ~ '  as well as all of the existing water pollutant trading pro- 
grams.n 
In a closed trading program the sources which are subject to the 
program are specified by statute, regulation or other mechanism." 
A regulatory agency or other entity sets a cap, fixed or declining, 
on the amount of pollutants that a watershed, air shed or ecosys- 
tem may absorb.74 Once this cap or baseline is set, dischargers are 
allocated a specified number of pollution units (allowances), and 
will produce a surplus of credits or allowances when they reduce 
their pollutant loads below the a l l~ca t ion .~~ These surplus pollu- 
tion units may be traded with other sources in the program, or may 
be "banked" for future use. . No allocations are made for new 
sources, which must purchase unused allowances to gain market 
entry." In this way, new sources will not affect the total aggregate 
limit placed on the pollutant of concern.77 These concepts are 
70. See Introduction to Ma&-Based F'rograms, supra note 17, 1 9. Because of the relatively 
unregulated nature of open programs, and the possibility of hot spots, it is unlikely that the 
Environmental Protection Agency would allow open trading to address water pollution. See 
D w  FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 24. 
71. Clean Air Act 5 402,42 U.S.C. § 7651. 
72. DM FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at Appendix C. 
73. See Faeth, What is Trading?, supra note 54, 1 2; Introd~ution to Market-Based Aograms, 
supra note 17,11 7-10. 
74. Faeth, What is Trading?, supra note 54 ,12 .  
75. Seeid 
76. &AT. KWU(NEY, INC., supra note 33, at 2-10. 
77. See id. at 2-9. The Drap Framnuak does not use the open-market/closed-market termi- 
nology. However, EPA's Trading Principle 3 enunciates that states must establish TMDLs 
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somewhat confusing in the abstract, but an exploration of trading 
under the Clean Air Act will help in gaining a clearer understand- 
ing of how they work in practice. 
C. Trading Experience Under the Clean Air Act 
The first large scale pollution trading program was undertaken 
pursuant to Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the 
acid deposition control provisions.78 Other sections of the Act also 
allow trading in some fashion, and merit examination. Some of 
these predate the acid deposition provisions, and provided early 
experience in market mechanisms. These early trading mecha- 
nisms are bubbles, netting, offsets, and banking.rJ By examining 
each, the potential cost savings and environmental impacts of emis- 
sion trading can better be understood. 
1. Bubbles (regulation of existing sources) 
Under the Clean Air Act a single facility may be composed of 
numerous emitting units or "sources," each subject to individual 
controls. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) introduced 
regulatory flexibility into this situation through a "bubble" policy 
which allows existing plants (or groups of plants) with multiple 
emission sources to be treated, for regulatory purposes, as a single 
s o u r ~ e . ~  Once the Agency has approved a bubble, provided the 
total emissions limit is met by the plant, it may vary source emis- 
81 
sions within the facility as it desires. The bubble policy was u p  
where technology-based limits are insufficient to protect water quality, at required in section 
303(d) of the Clean Water Act. Scc infia notes 190-197 and accompanying texc 33 U.S.C. 3 
1313. In such cases it appears that an open-market system would be unavailable. Scc DRAFT 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-6. 
78. SccClean Air Act 55 410416.42 U.S.C. $5 7651i-76510 (1994). 
79. Scc LIROFF, Ton. & TROUBLE, supra note 13, at 39; Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. 
Hester, WhereLM All the Markets Go? An Analysis ofEPA's Emissions Trading Aogram, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 109, 118136 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, W e  Did All fhe Markets Gol]; 
Hahn, Doctor's Or&, supra note 13, at 9899; Hahn & Hester, MarketabIc Permits. supra note 
62, at 368376; Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is thir Thoroughbred 
Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J  E m .  L. 217,223229 (1988) [hereinafter Dudek & Palmisano, Emir- 
sionr T ~ a d i n d .  In its review of the various pollution control methods available to policy 
makers the Oflice of Technology Assessment characterized bubbles and netting as inte- 
grated permitting rather than trading since they deal with pollution transfers within a single 
facility, and not between facilities. See ENVIRONMENTAL PO ICY TOOLS, s u p  note 11, at 108. 
80. EPA, Emissions Trading Policy Statement General Principles for Creation, Banking, 
and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986) [hereinafter 
EPA Emissions Trading Policy]. 
81. Id SccLtROW, TOIL & TROUBLE, supra note 13, at e, Hahn & Hester, WhenDid All fhe 
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held by the Supreme Court in Chamm v. NRDC," but remains con- 
troversial because under the policy some sources escape othexwise 
applicable technology requirements, and other sources have on 
occasion been manipulated to avoid stricter emission standards,89 
with potentially adverse environmental consequences. Nonethe- 
less, the deferential standard articulated by the Court when review- 
ing EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act provisions certainly has 
relevance as the Agency develops pollutant trading policies under 
the Clean Water ~ c t . ~  
2. Netting (modification of existing source) 
Netting is a concept similar to a bubble, but is employed when a 
major emitting source under the Clean Air Act undertakes a modi- 
fication resulting in increased emi~sions.'~ If there are other units 
or sources within the same facility which can reduce emissions to 
compensate for the new emissions caused by the modification, cer- 
tain preconstruction permit requirements can be a~oided.'~ Net- 
ting is the most frequently employed method of trading by a wide 
margin. It has been calculated that some 8,000 sources used net- 
ting between 1974 and 1984: with an estimated saving of $25 to 
$300 million in permitting costs, in addition to $500 million to $12 
billion saved in emission control costs,88 although the accuracy of 
Markets'Go?, supra note 79, at 12329. 
82. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (a landmsk opinibn which held that ihere  the legislative intent 
of a statute is ambiguous, the court must grant great deference to the interpretation of the 
agency). 
83. Sec LIROFF, TOIL & TROUBLE, s u p a  note 13, at 98-99; David M. Driesen, Is Emirsirms 
Trading a n  Econmnic Incentive Rugram?: @lacing the Gnnmand and Control/Economic Incentive 
Dithobmy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 39). Hahn & Hester, Where Did AU thc Markets Go?, 
supra note 79, at 123. EPA policy does not allow emission reduction.from existing sources to 
meet technology based requirements applicable to new or modified s ta t ionq sources. EPA 
Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830. Through 1985, EPA had only approved 
42 bubbles under the Act. See Hahn & Hester, W e  Did AU the Markets Go?, supra note 79, at 
123. However, state-permitted bubbles, available in a few states, had been created on a more 
frequent basis. Id at 137. 
84. For an example of the "bubble" concept used in the water pollution control context 
see Part IV, B, 4. 
85. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830. 
86. Id See m o m ,  TOIL & TROUBLE, supra note 13, at 6; Hahn & Hester. W e  Did All the 
Markets Go?. supra note 79, at 132-136. 
87. Sec Hahn & Hester, W e  Did AU the Markets Go?, supra note 79, at 133.  he authors 
point out that netting could have an adverse impact on local air quality if several sources in a 
single area utilized this method of wading. Sec id at 136. 
88. Sec i d  at 138, Table 4. 
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these types of figures has been questioned.89 Both bubbles and net- 
ting apply to existing sources within the same facility or under the 
same ownership. The next category, offsets, apply more generally 
to new sources. 
3. Offsets (new sources) 
Under the Clean Air Act, new major emitting units or sources 
seeking to emit pollutants in areas where air quality is impaired 
may only do so if the total load of pollutants to the environment is 
not increased. To accomplish this, new sources are required to 
"offset" their anticipated emissions by finding an existing source 
able and willing to reduce by the same, or a greater, amount.'' 
This offset can be achieved through internal trades between emis- 
sion sources within a single facility or external trades with another 
entity.g1 Offset provisions essentially create an open market in 
which the regulatoxy limitations placed on sources to attain Na- 
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards for the traded pollutant are 
used as individual baselines for sources engaging in trades, but 
there is no overall numerical cap. Over 2,000 offsets transactions 
occurred between 1977 and 1986, however, external trades ac- 
counted for only a small percentage of the offsets.= This may re- 
sult from a lack of "readily identifiable" sellers, and subsequently 
higher transaction costs to find suitable trading partners.93 As for 
environmental impacts, at least some commentators have con- 
cluded that although offset transactions may not protect air quality 
as effectively as possible in all instances, they have not had a signifi- 
cant negative impact on environmental 
89. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Inuntivc Aogram?: R@lacing the 
Command and Gmhol/Econmic IncmtivcDichotomy, s u p  note 14, (manuscript at 3334). 
90. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830-831. The offset policy origi- 
nally developed by EPA was subsequently adopted by Congress in various provisions of the 
Clean Air Act amendments of 1977. See, cg.,' Clean Air Act 5 173(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 
7503(c) (general); Clean Air Act 5 182(a) (4), (b) (5). [cl(10), (d) (2), & (e) (1). 42 U.S.C. § 
751 la(a) (4). (b) (5). [c] (lo), (d) (2), & (e) (1) (ozone nonattainment). 
91. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830-831. Scc LIROFF, TOIL & 
TROUBLE, supra note 13, at 6-7; Hahn & Hester, Whcrc Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 79, 
at 119123. 
92. Scc Hahn & Hester, WhcrcDid All the ManActr Go?, supra note 79, at 1 19120. 
93. Scc id at 122. 
94. Scc id; Dudek & Palmisano, Emircimrr Trading, supm note 79, at 122-23. 
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4. Banking 
A fourth mechanism under the Clean Air Act, banking? allows 
firms to store credits for future use or sale,% but it has not been 
particularly effective." A credit bank can also be used as a market 
place in which credit buyers and sellers can be located at a minimal 
transaction cost. However, banking activity has been nearly nonex- 
istent as banks have not effectively promoted trading, nor have 
firms deposited many credits. Hence, banking has had a de mini- 
mis effect on air quality and cost savings. It has been suggested 
that two factors may be responsible for this inactivity. First, firms 
find little use for banks in attainment areas, which have no offset 
requirements. The utility of banked credits is further diminished 
by other restrictions which may limit the use to credits to only off- 
set or internal application. Secondly, the uncertain nature and 
value of banked credits explains the dearth of banking activity. 
Banked credits may be reduced or eliminated by a change in regu- 
latory policy. Limited credit-life also raises the possibility that cred- 
its may disappear prior to an opportunity for their use.'' 
5. Title IV Acid Deposition Control Program 
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act brought about a ma- 
jor change in the manner of dealing with acid deposition by creat- 
ing an emission trading program for sulfur dioxide The 
program, known as the "Title IV program," seeks to reduce the 
emissions of sulfur dioxide from electrical utilities by setting an 
overall cap on SO, emissions and creating a scheme of tradable 
emission allo~ances. '~ The trading provisions are a free standing 
95. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 79, at 43,831. 
96. Su LIROFF, TOIL & TROUBLE, supra note 13, at 7; Hahn & Hester, Where Did AU Lhc Mar- 
k& Go?. supra note 79, at 129-132; EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 79, at 43,831. 
97. Hahn & Hester, WhereDid AU flu Mark& Go?, supra note 79, at 119,130-131,137. 
98. Set id 
99. Sec Pub . L. 101-549, title IV, 5 403, 104 Stat. 2589 (Nov. 15, 1990) (codified as Clean 
Air Act 5 403,42 U.S.C. § 7651 b). 
100. Clean Air Act 5 403, 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b (1995). The amendments also address an- 
other pollutant implicated in acid deposition, nitrogen oxides (NOx), but not through an 
allowance trading program. Instead, performance standards are required, although there is 
some allowance for averaging between uniu with the same owner or operator. clean Air Act 
5 407(c), (e), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651f (c), (e)(1995). EPA has promulgated regulations which al- 
low a state or group of states to establish a cap and trade program for NOx under defined 
circumstances, 40 C.F.R. 5 76.16 (1997), and is developing a model NOx trading rule. 62 
Fed. Reg. 54,409 (1997). The 1990 amendments did include a directive to the Adminisua- 
tor to evaluate and report to Congress by 1994 on the environmental and economic consc 
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program, separate from the general design of the air pollution 
control program based on national ambient air quality standards 
carried out through state implementation plans. Under this 
"closed" trading program, a specified group of utilities received ini- 
tial allocations of tradable allowances based on an annual tonnage 
emissions formula set forth in the statute.lO' Utilities which reduce 
their emissions below allocation levels may sell the excess allow- 
ances; if a utility emits more that the allowances it is allocated, it 
can remain in compliance by purchasing additional allowances 
from other electric generating units or the EPA which holds a lim- 
ited number of allowances for auction.lW The Title IV program has 
two-phases, the first of which became effective in 19951°3 and a p  
plies to 110 utility plants specified in the Clean Air Act, most of 
which are large, coal-fired Midwestern power plants.'04 Phase 11 will 
regulate approximately an additional 700 utility plants after Janu- 
ary 1, 2000.1°5 
While the commentators are not uniform in their assessments of 
the program, three observations summarize the Title IV program 
to date. The first is that SO, emission reductions thus far have ex- 
ceeded present Clean Air Act requirements. Second, the cost of 
this compliance has been below that which was projected. Finally, 
quences of trading sulfur dioxide allowance for nitrogen oxides allowances. Clean Air Act § 
403(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(c)(1995). The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments also greatly ex- 
panded the number of instances where emission trading or other market-based control con- 
cepts may be used. See, e . ~ ,  Clean Air Act §§ 607, 616, 42 U.S.C. 7671f, 76710 (1995) 
(chlorofluorocarbon trading); Clean Air Act 211(k) (7) (A), (m) (5 ) ,  42 U.S.C. § 
7545(k) (7) (A), (m) (5) (reformulated gasoline credits; marketable oxygen credits for fuels); 
Clean Air Act 5 246(f), 42 U.S.C. 7586(f) (1995) (centrally fueled fleets). See also Hahn & 
Stavins, Inwntivc Based-Environmental Regulation, supra note 54, at 22 n.136. 
101. Clean Air Act 5 403(a), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(a) (1995); Acid Rain Program: General 
Provisions and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, Excess Emis- 
sions and Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590 (Jan. 11, 1993); 40 C.F.R Parts 72, 73, 
75,77 & 78 (1997). 
102. Clean Air Act 5 403(b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(b) (1995). EPA is a vendor of what are 
designated Special Reserve Allowances, representing 2.8 percent of the annually allocated 
allowances. Clean Air Act 416(b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651o(b) (1995). 
103. Clean Air Act 55 404,405,42 U.S.C. $5 7651c, 7651d. 
104. See Clean Air Act 5 404, Table A, 42 U.S.C. 5 7651c Table A (1995); U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED9530, AIR POLLUTION: ALLOWANCE TRADING O m  AN 
OPPORTUNI'IYTO REDUCE EMISSIONS AT LESS COS 16 (1994) [hereinafter GAO, ALLOWANCE 
TRADING]; David Sohn and Madeline Cohen, From S n w R c s ~  to Spcciw: Extending the Tradoblc 
P m i t  Approach From Air Pollution tu Habitat Cmrcmatirm, 15 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 405, 422-23 
(1996) [hereinafter Sohn & Cohen. Smokcshch]. 
105. &Clean Air Act 5 405,42 U.S.C. 5 7651d (1995); GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra 
note 104, at 16. 
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there has been very limited allowance trading activity.Io6 
Overall, the Title IV program appears to have led to a sharp re- 
duction in SO, emissions in the first years of operation. In a 1997 
report, the Environmental Protection Agency indicated that for 
1996 all of the sources covered by the law were in compliance with 
their emission limitations, either through actual emission reduc- 
tions or by the purchase of allowances. Moreover, SO, emissions 
were 5.4 million tons, 2.9 million tons (35 percent) below Title IV's 
maximum  level^.'^' It is suggested that the reduction in emissions 
resulted in decreased sulfate deposition in the Northeast, with cor- 
responding increases in benefits to human health.'08 From an envi- 
ronmental standpoint, because the targeted reduction of SO, emis- 
sions for Phase I has already been exceeded, terming the allowance 
trading program a present success would not be inaccurate. 
As to the second point, Title IV compliance has been achieved at 
costs well below those that were projected. An indicator of the 
costs of reducing SO, emissions is the price of the allowances them- 
selves. Despite early predictions ranging between $300 to $1000 
per ton of SO, reduction, the average price of an allowance during 
1996 was less than $100 per ton,''' and has dipped to as low as $68 
per ton.'1° However, judging the actual cost savings due to trading 
is difficult for several reasons. First, while the proponents of trad- 
ing point to these figures as a sign of the cost effectiveness of the 
program, it is obvious that some of the disparity between estimates 
and current costs stems from inflated estimates used by industry to 
oppose the program."' Second, although increased flexibility in 
106. See GAO, AU.OWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 4, 25, 27; Byron Swift, The Acid 
Rain Test, 14 ENVTL. FORUM: THE POUCY JOURNAL OF THE ENVTL. L. INST. NO. 3 16 
(May/June 1997) [hereinafter Swift, Acid Rain Test]; Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New 
Standard of Per fmnce:  An Ana4si.s o f h e  Clean Air Act5 Acid Rain Program, 26 E m .  L. REP. 
( E m .  L. INST.) 10411 (1996); Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note 104, at 424-426. 
107. &? OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
EPA/43@R-97-025, 1996 COMPLIANCE REPORT: ACID RAIN TRADING PROGRAM 7 (1997) 
(visited Apr. 15, 1998) <'http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/cmprpt96/crl996.hml"> 
[hereinafter 1996 COMPLIANCE REPORT]. 
108. Seeswift, Acid Rain Test, supra note 106, at 17. 
109. Sec Swift, Acid Rain Test, supra note 106, at 22. The working assumption at the time 
of passage was that costs would be in the $1000 a ton range. Gregory Wetstone, Crmgressional 
Effmts to Eradicate Environmental Laws, 14 PACE E N v n .  L. REV. 123,124 (1996). 
110. EPA, 1996 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 107, at 10. The price of an allowance 
may not indicate the actual cost of a ton of emission reduction today, but instead may reflect 
the long-term scarcity value, or marginal cost. Swift, Acid Rain Tat, supra note 106, at 22. 
11 1. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissim Trading an Economic Incenlil~e Program?: @lacing the 
Command and Gmtrol/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 42); Mat- 
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control options may contribute to the decrease in compliance 
costs, the drop has been greatly aided by reduced rail costs which 
have encouraged utilities to switch to lower sulfur western coal, and 
also by reduced costs of improved scrubber technologies.112 Plus, 
the demand for additional allowances has been suppressed. This is 
primarily attributed to the large quantity of surplus emission allow- 
ances, which keep the price at relatively low levels.113 The resultant 
excess allowances are being saved ("banked") for future compli- 
ance needs.l14 Finally, although the program has reduced the over- 
all cost of complying with C.A.A. requirements, it has not reached 
expected levels. Factors which may have impacted this result in- 
clude transaction costs.l15 
Title IV has been characterized by sparse allowance trading activ- 
ity; in most cases trading has not been used to achieve compliance 
even in instances where the potential for significant cost savings is 
apparent."= The General Accounting Office reported that only 
three percent of Phase I utilities planned to use allowance pur- 
thew L. Wald, Acid-Rain Pollution Credits Arc Not Enticing Utilities, N.Y TIMES, June 5, 1995, at 
A l l  ("indusuy executives picked high numbers in effort to dissuade Congress from impos- 
ing stricter standards"). See also Jim Bradley, Buying Htgh, Selling Low, E/THE ENVIRON- 
MENTAL MAGAZINE, July-Aug. 1996, < http://www.emagazine.com/2curr3.html>, fi 6. 
112. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  IN^, IMPLEMENTING AN EMISSIONS CAP AND ALLOWANCE 
TRADING !hXll% FOR GREENHOUSE GASES: bSONS FROM THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM 2-3 (1997) 
[hereinafter ELI REPORT]; Professor Driesen concludes that the low cost of controls may 
result from conditions that would have produced the same results in a traditional regulatory 
program. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Econmnic Incentive Program?: @ k i n g  the 
Command and Control/Economic ImtiveDichotmny, supra note 14, (manuschpt at 41-42). - 
113. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incmtive Program?: Replacing the 
Command and Control/Economic IncmtiveDichotomy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 41-42); Sohn 
& Cohen, SmoRestacRr, supra note 104, at 425; GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 
27. 
1 14. GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 2526. 
115. Id at 25,5355. In the only study to explore the prospective costs versus the benefits 
of the Title IV program, researchers at Resources for the Future found that the expected 
benefits, mainly in reduced mortality risk, will substantially outweigh the compliance costs to 
electric utilities. DALW BURTRAW, ALAN KRUPNICK, ERIN MANSUR, DAVID AUSTIN, AND 
DEIRDRE FARRELL, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING ACID RAIN 2 (Discussion Paper 97- 
31-REV) (1997). 
116. Scc Sohn & Cohen, SmoRcrhckr, supra note 104, at 425426; GAO, ALLOWANCE 
TRADING, supra note 104, at 3. The picture is not totally negative on trading activity. EPA 
data indicates that there was a doubling of the volume of allowances traded (between or- 
ganization not counting internal trades) from 1995 to 1996, and a second doubling from 
1996 to 1997. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Acid Rain Rogram: Trading Activity 
Ere*: Cumulative Graphics (visited Apr. 15,1998) <http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/ 
qlyupd>. 
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chases as a major means of achieving compliance.1i7 The dearth of 
trading activities seems to be a result of a combination of factors. 
First, the two-phase design of the program unwittingly separates the 
natural sellers of allowances (e.g. the largest emitters) from the 
natural buyers (e.g. smaller plants which are not subject to Phase I 
regulation) until the year 2000.'18 Additionally, price confusion 
and a scarcity of price information make it difficult for a company 
to assess the market accurately.'1g This is compounded by the ten- 
dency of the utility industry to be risk-adverse and conservative, in 
part because of the impact which government regulation may have 
on its profit margins.i20 Moreover, interstate trading is resisted by 
some states which oppose the transfer of allowances from in-state 
facilities to out-of-state facilities located upwind."' Nevertheless, a 
number of observers express belief that trading will increase as the 
market matures and as the more stringent requirements of Phase I1 
take effect.ln 
117. GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 27. 
118. See Swift, Acid Rain Test, supra note 106, at 22; Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note 
104, at 426; -0, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 4.344. 
119. &Swift, Acid Rain Tat, supra note 106, at 22; Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note 
104, at 426427; GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 5358. 
120. See Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note 104, at 427; GAO ALLOWANCE TRADING, 
supra note 104, at 43,4547. Utilities are also concerned that EPA regulations may be issued 
for other pollutants which will affect compliance options. Id. at 5. 
Other impediments to trading cited by the General Accounting Office include problems 
with the design of EPA's auction, the manner in which allowances are treated for capital 
gains tax purposes, and lingering environmental concerns. GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, 
supra note 104, at 43. 
121. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, State Reactions to tlw Trading of Emissionr AUowances Under 
Titlc IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 22 B.C. EWL. AFF. L. REV. 201, 207 (1995) 
[hereinafter Mostaghel, Sta& Reactions]. New York filed suit against EPA to prevent New 
York-based utilities from trading allowances to utilities in the Midwest, id at 208 (citing New 
York v. EPA, No. 93-1214 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar 12, 1993)), and the legislatures of New York 
and Wisconsin were contemplating bills to prohibit emission allowance mdes to upwind 
facilities. See id at 209-10. See alro Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (Tb Cir. 
1995) (striking down Illinois Coal Act); See alro Bradley, supra note 11 1, 1 11-12. These and 
other states have enacted laws to control acid deposition, which may be used to regulate in- 
uastate trading. See Mostaghel, State Reactions at 21 1. Also, states which produce highsulfur 
coal may restrict trading to protect their coal industries. See id. at 214. Mostaghel contends 
that these types of regional controls could deter interstate allowance trading by making trad- 
ing cumbersome and interfering with Tile W s  free-market approach. See id at 224. 
122. See, e.5, Swift, Acid Rain Tat, supra note 106, at 17. We should also consider the im- 
pact that deregulation of the utility industry might have on the future of the trading pro- 
gram. It is possible that properly structured competition and technological advances will 
take many old plants out of use, leaving a huge surplus of unwanted allowances. Conversely, 
closure of nuclear plants, coincident with a spurt in demand brought on by lower electric 
prices and a rise in gas prices might mean a very tight market for sukur dioxide and a spun 
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In spite of apparent progress made under Title IV in reducing 
emission, concerns still exist. The banked emission allowances are 
likely to reach the 10 million ton mark as the tighter limits of Phase 
I1 take effect, therefore, many years may pass before the allowances 
are exhausted and the more stringent emission levels actually have 
an impact. If this simply means that we are enjoying the benefits of 
early reductions, and will eventually reach the targeted goals, then 
well and good, especially if money has been saved in the process.12s 
But questions have been raised as to whether allowances have been 
accurately calculated and assigned, and to what extent they might 
not represent real reductions.12* The distributional issue is a trou- 
blesome one; a citizen living in the shadow of a smokestack may 
not take comfort in the overall cost efficiency when told that the 
plant, instead of reducing its emissions, will exercise the option of 
purchasing allowances from afar.'= 
If we accept the Title IV program as a success, there are several 
elements which arguably contribute to its effectiveness, and ought 
to be included in any pollutant trading program. Obviously, a 
clear baseline must be established from which trades can be made, 
and it must reflect an adequate level of protection for the envi- 
ronment. Of paramount importance to a trading program is a 
thorough and effective monitoring requirement.'26 Without this, 
in trading. 
123. However, one observer noted that '[ilf Congress was striking a balance between en- 
vironmental toughness and financial mercy, it could have required tougher standards for 
the amount it had agreed to make utilities spend." Wald, supra note 11 1, at A1 1. 
124. The formula which Congress dictated for allocating allowances was based on histori- 
cal fuel consumption which may have been higher than a given facility's current usage, thus 
creating unearned "paper credits" which did not reflect actual pollution reductions. In ad- 
dition, utilities were allowed to earn credits when they achieved reductions that they were 
otherwise mandated to carry out by technology based requirements. SeeDaniel A. Seligman, 
Sierra Club, Air Pollution Emissions Trading: Opportunity or Scam? A Guide for Activists 16 
(1994). The original allocations specified in the statute therefore grandfathered much pol- 
lution, and contained "politically inspired exceptions," which sewed "special interests at 
public expense." ELI REPORT, supra note 113, at 35. In addition, special bonus provisions 
for such items as early cleanup tended to enlarge the number of allowances banked. Id 
125. It is worth noting that the NOx reduction program also resulted in substantial reduc- 
tions in its first year through traditional emission limitations, with averaging by commonly 
owned units. All units subject to the NOx requirements in 1996 were in compliance with 
applicable emission limitations, and total emissions declined 33 percent from 1990 to 1996. 
Sec EPA, 1996 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 107, at 12,14,16. 
126. Scc ELI REPORT, supra note 112, at ii. Facilities subject to Title IV must install, main- 
tain, and report the results from a continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS). Clean 
Air Act 3 412(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a) (1995). If for some reason monitoring data is not 
obtained, the facility may be deemed to be operating in an uncontrolled fashion during the 
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there can be no assurance that trading units represent actual pollu- 
tion reductions. Key elements of Title IV are the enforcement pro- 
visions, and the substantial noncompliance penalties.'57 Finally, 
there is a publicly available allowance tracking system that should 
foster compliance and enforcement.lS 
Despite the minimal trading activity,. the program is still gener- 
ally regarded as having spurred a reduction in current emission 
levels. At least one commentator has suggested that even if little 
reduction in costs or innovation in controls result from a trading 
program, a well-designed. program may be worthwhile because it is 
politically effective in reducing opposition to  control^.'^^ This 
comment may be applicable beyond the Title IV program. 
6. EPA's Lead Phasedown Program 
Before concluding our examination of air pollution related trad- 
ing programs, an additional effort in this area merits attention: the 
program employed by EPA to eliminate lead as a gasoline additive. 
To reduce the high levels of airborne lead, EPA in 1982 inaugu- 
rated an "inter-refinery averaging" program allowing gasoline re- 
finers to trade rights to use lead additives.lW Under the program, 
refiners were permitted to trade lead content allowances which 
were proportionate to the amount of lead added to the gasoline 
being produced. These allowances could be deposited in a "bank" 
for a period of up to three years. The program was characterized 
by an active trading market, with over half of all refineries making 
trades."' The result was a program which dramatically reduced 
and eventually eliminated the use of lead in gasoline, apparently 
with substantial cost efficiency.'32 
entire period for which data is not available, and penalized accordingly. Clean Air Act 5 
412(d), 42 U.S.C. $7651k(d) (1995). 
127. Clean Air Act Section 411(a) establishes a penalty of $2000 a ton for excess emis-. 
sions. 42 U.S.C. 5 7651j(a) (1995). In addition, the facility must offset the excess emissions 
by an equal amount in the next calendar year. Clean Air Act 5 41 1 (b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651j(b) 
(1995). 
128. &Clean Air Act 5 403(d), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(d) (1995). 
129. David M. Driesen, Five h n s f i o r n  the Cleun Air Act Imphuntation, 14 PACE E ~ L .  L. 
REV. 51.58 (1996). 
130. 40 C.F.R 5 80.20(d) (1988) (expired Jan. 1,1986) EPA, Regulation of Fuel and Fuel 
Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322 (1982) (expired, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,116 (1985)). For a full de- 
scription of the program see Hahn & Hester, Marketable P m i t r ,  supra note 62, at 380-391. 
131. Hahn & Stavins, Inuntiuc Based-Environmental Regulation, supra note 54, at 17; Hahn 
& Hester, Marketable P m i t s ,  supra note 62, at 384-391. 
132. Hahn & Hester, Mankctable Pmnits, supra note 62, at 380-391. 
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Commentators point to several factors which they assert made 
this program a success. First, the program had a clear goal: elimi- 
nation of lead in gasoline, as well as a fixed end.'" Second, transac- 
tion costs were relatively low and trading was easy to monitor be- 
cause the market participants were a small and homogeneous pool 
of refiners who had previously traded refinery product amongst 
themselves. Added to that, creation of the allowance bank pro- 
vided additional flexibility and resulted in a significant increase in 
trading activity. Finally, the program had a. simple regulatory 
framework which lacked burdensome restrictions such as credit 
certification or trade approval requirements.'" While this led one 
author to single out the program as coming closest to the econo- 
mist's ideal,lS5 the actual market driver seems to be the eventual 
ban, which suggests that a traditional phasedown program might 
well have achieved the same re~u1ts.I~~ 
~v. EPA's DRAFT WEWORK FOR WAT~RSHED-BASED TRADING 
A. In General 
The experience in emissions trading under the Clean Air Act, 
along with a growing interest in pursuing market based pollution 
reduction measures, spawned efforts to adapt the lessons learned 
thus far to water pollution controls. In 1996 the Environmental 
133. SeeHahn, Doctor's Ordm, supra note 13, at 10243. 
134. Seed 
135. HAHN, supra note 11, at 41*, Hahn, Doctmk &dm, supra note 13, at 101. See David 
M. Driesen, Is Em- Trading an Economic Incentive Rogram?: @lacing the Command and 
Gmtrol/Econonic Incmtiue Dichotomy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 39). 
136. An additional trading program worth noting is the Regional Clean Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM) which allows for the allocation and trading of emission credits among 
firms in Los Angeles, emitting nitrogen oxides (NO,) and sulfur oxides (SO,). The 
RECWM program is administered by the South Coast Air Quality Management Disuict 
(SCAQMD), which oversees federal and state air legislation for the Los Angeles area. The 
number of credits annually allocated by SCAQMD diminishes each year in order to facilitate 
reducing NO, and SO, emissions by a set percentage. Credits are typically swapped at semi- 
annual credit auctions or  over the Internet. Trades must be recorded by SCAQMD, but do 
not require prior approval or public input. 
While the RECWM trading market was sluggish shortly after its inception in 1994, it has 
become quite active. The cost of emission reduction has been lower than that anticipated 
under a command-andcontrol regime, as the price of credits continues to fall. The large 
number of firms, in addition to the simple regulato~y framework and the various forums for 
trades, keeps transaction costs low. See Sohn & Cohen. Smokestack, supra note 104, at 430- 
432 
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Protection Agency (EPA) published a Draft Framework for Water- 
shd-Based Trading, which is essential to understanding the regime 
within which a water pollutant trading program must operate.lg7 
The Draft Framework does not, however, provide an adequate ana- 
lytical basis either for evaluating the legal aspects of 'a proposed 
program, or forjudging its economic and administrative aspects. 
The Agency's goal, as expressed in the Draft Framework, is "to as- 
sure that trading programs are designed to provide flexibility with 
accountability as well as incentives to trade" within the existing 
framework of federal, state and local governmental statutes and 
regulations.198 The DraJt Framework encourages innovation in meet- 
ing water quality goals, yet supports only those trades that adhere 
to water quality requirements set forth under the Clean Water 
~ c t . ' ' ~  Moreover, EPA spells out clearly in the document that it 
"will not depart from its enforcement and compliance responsibili- 
ties under the CWA . . . [and] [tlrades that depend on fundarnen- 
tal changes in EPA's enforcement and compliance responsibilities 
will not be al l~wed." '~ It does not, however, analyze how various 
trading schemes might or might not comport with the require- 
ments of the Act and regulations. 
The Draft Framework recognizes five different kinds of trading, 
two of which are most relevant to proposals being put forth for the 
Sound. The first, "point/point," occurs when one point source at- 
tains greater than required pollutant reductions, and trades those 
reductions to another point source which cannot achieve its re- 
quired pollution reduction."' The second type of trading, 
"point/nonpoint," trading occurs where a point source arranges 
for a nonpoint source to undertake best management practices 
(BMPs) to reduce polluted runoff in lieu of performing plant u p  
grades.142 Currently the type of trading being discussed for Long 
137. See D m  WEWORK, supra note 61. The document is intended to "a framework 
on how best to implement the Clean Water Act and EPA's regulations to facilitate pollutant 
trading in watersheds." 'Id at iv. In actuality, there is very little discussion of the details of 
srruc&ng programs which meet legal requirements. The Draft Framework is also intended 
to provide information on how EPA intends to exercise its discretion in implementing its 
regulations. The Agency asserts specifically that the Draft Framework is not a regulation, 
and is not legally binding. Id 
138. Sec id at i. 
139. Sec id. at xi. 
140. Id 
141. Set id at xv. 
142. Sec id. The three other types of trading are "intra-plant", 'pretreatment", and 
'nonpoint/nonpointn. The most suaightfonvard, intra-plant, occurs when a facility has sew 
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Island sound is point/point, with the possibility of point/nonpoint 
left open for future c~nsideration.'~~ 
In the DraJ Frameumk, the Agency has further spelled out general 
principles which it believes a trading scheme should follow in or- 
der to comply with existing laws and regulations for attaining water 
quality. 
B. The Framework's Principles 
Although EPA has defined in the DraJ Frameumk eight separate 
principles'M to guide pollutant trading, to some extent, significant 
overlap exists and they may effectively be consolidated and restated 
as four principles. First, trades must occur within constraints of the 
Clean Water Act. Specifically, point sources must meet technology- 
based standards established under the Act; the trades must be con- 
sistent with attainment of water quality standards, including the 
processes used to implement the  standard^;"^ trades must occur in 
the context of current regulatory (i.e., permitting) and enforce- 
146 
ment mechanisms; and they must include public participation."' 
era1 permitted outfalls and is allowed to shift pollutants from outfall to outfall, so long as the 
combined permitted discharge with trading is not greater than without. Id. at xv, 52. Pre- 
treatment refers to the program requiring industries which discharge to publicly owned 
sewage treatment plants to 'pretreat" their wastes prior to discharge in order to avoid inter- 
fering with the' sewage plant's operations or causing pollutants to pass-through the plant 
without adequate treatment. See Clean Water Act 5 307(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1317(b) (1994). In 
a trading program the sewage treatment plant arrange with the pretreater to undertake 
greater than required reductions in its pollutant discharge to the plant, in lieu of the plant 
performing upgrades of its own system. Sec DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at xv, 61. 
Nonpoint/nonpoint trading occurs where one nonpoint source ananges for BMPs at an- 
other nonpoint source in lieu of installing or upgrading more expensive BMPs at its own 
site. See id. at xv, 8-1. 
143. SeekT. KEARNN, INC., Supra note 33, Exhibit 44, at 4-20. For an interpretive survey 
of the research into and the practical experience with point/nonpoint trading, in which the 
author concludes that its time has not yet come, see Letson, Point/Non@'nt Source Pollution 
Reduction Trading: An Interpretive Su-, supra note 42. See also Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint h r u  
Trading, s u p  note 62 (may offer cost-effective control alternative in limited number of wa- 
terbodies). 
144. & D m  WEWORK, supra note 61, at 24. 
145. Technology-based standards and water quality standards are discussed in Pan IV, in- 
fin. 
146. S e e D m  FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-7. 
147. EPA expresses strong support for the role which stakeholders play in ensuring envi- 
ronmental protection and assem that stakeholder involvement and public participation are 
key components of trading. Trading is envisioned as a partnership decision that brings the 
regulators, the regulated, and the public together to form a solution to water quality p rob  
lems. It is viewed as a way to build alliances between stakeholders and to educate the general 
public. Ultimately, trading with stakeholder involvement is a way of promoting local solu- 
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Second, trading boundaries should generally coincide with water- 
shed or waterbody segment boundaries to ensure that the envi- 
ronmental consequences of trades between parties occur in the 
same waterbody or strearn/river segment.148 Boundaries should be 
of manageable size and should be selected to prevent localized 
problems.149 Third, trading should generally result in increased wa- 
ter quality monitoring to assure that trading is not having an ad- 
verse environmental effect.15' Fourth, EPA requires that careful 
consideration be given to the types of pollutants traded, and dis- 
courages trading of toxics,151 or of one pollutant for another.'52 
Of these four categories, a nitrogen trading program on Long Is- 
land Sound would appear on its face to satisfy the second and 
fourth principles; the trading program boundaries match the g e e  
graphic boundaries, and only one pollutant (nontoxic) is involved. 
As to the third category, since point sources are primarily involved, 
there is already an established, if not necessarily sufficient, moni- 
toring system.153 Beyond that, considerable monitoring and model- 
ing has been in order to establish the yearly loadings, which, bar- 
ring funding cutbacks, should continue. This should help to 
provide the technical information essential in determining whether 
trading is adversely affecting water quality in the Sound. The re- 
maining category, compliance with the existing regulatory program 
will be discussed in Part IV. 
tions to local problems. See id at 2-10-11: Encouragement of citizen participation and place- 
based-programs are key themes in current Agency activities. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FI- 
NANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/190-R-97402, EPA 
STRATEGIC PLAN 13,20,29,50,83-84 (1997). 
148. DRAFT W E W O R K ,  supra note 61, at 28. 
149. Id. 
150. Id at 2-9. 
151. Toxics present special problems since localized "hot spots" may present risks to both 
human health and the environment. Toxics are also often persistent in the environment, 
and accumulate in the foodchain. Set Robert I. Fassbender, Redm'ng Great L.aka Toxics: Can 
WeDo Morefor Less Through WastezuaterEfluent Trading?, 1 Wis. Envtl. L.J. 57, 83 (1994). The 
author recognizes that technology standards would have to be attained, and suggests that 
trading could take place in the process of implementing water quality standards. Id at 84. 
See also Alexandra Teitz, Assessing Point SOUTCC Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in Control- 
ling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuaty, 21 Ecology L.Q. 79, 95 (1994) (only 
reductions beyond what is required by technology based-standards could be traded). 
152. S~DRAFT W E W O R K ,  s u p  note 61, at 2-9. This principle is not a ban on toxic pol- 
lutant trading, but ensures that toxic trading is given considerable thought. Additionally, 
this principle is not a ban on 'cross-pollutant" trading, but EPA does not believe such trades 
are possible under the current regulatoly framework. Therefore, all trades likely will involve 
the same pollutant. Id at 2-9-10. 
153. See40 C.F.R 3 122.48. 
Heinonline - -  23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 166 1998 
19981 Reducing Nitrogen Pollution 167 
Since its publication in May 1996, the Draft Framework has been 
assaulted by environmentalists and the regulated community 
alike.'" Environmentalists are validly concerned with the fact that 
the Draft Framework does not assure maintenance or improvement 
of water They seek a ban against trading among different 
watersheds and want to limit point/nonpoint trading until non- 
point source reduction is enforceable under the CWA.'~~ Industry, 
on the other hand, is calling for just the opposite, arguing that the 
Draft Framework is too restrictive and in need of greater flexibility.15' 
Due to these complaints the Agency is unlikely to issue a final ver- 
sion of the Framework in the near future, thus the draft will con- 
tinue to provide the best indication of EPA's approach to proposed 
water pollution trading programs such as the one being considered 
for Long Island sound.15' 
Barring congressional changes, a nitrogen trading program on 
Long Island Sound must take place within the wellestablished 
framework of the Clean Water including the goals of achiev- 
ing fishable/swimmable waters and eventually eliminating the dis- 
154. & EPA May ScaIc-Back Gmfrovmial Efluent Trading Framcluork, INSIDE EPA, January 
24, 1997, (Weekly Report), at 7; WATER ENVIRONMENT FEDERATION (WEF), COMMENTS ON 
D m  FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHEDBASED T R ~ I N G ,  September 9, 1996, on file with U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Comment Clerk, Water Docket MC-4101. These com- 
ments may also be found at the Federation's website, (visited Apr. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.wef.org/docs/uade.commenu.html~. 
155. &INSIDE EPA, supra note 153. at 7. 
156. Sierra Club, Comments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, Septem- 
ber 11, 1996; National Wildlife Federation, Comments by the National Wildlife Federation 
on the U.S.E.PA's Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, September 11, 1996. 
These comments are on file with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Comment 
Clerk, Water Docket MC-4101. The full text of comments received by the Agency as of De- 
cember 1996 may be found at <http://www.epa.gov/~~~~/watershed/&adecom.html~ 
(visited Apr. 15, 1998). 
157. & WEF, Comments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, supra note 
154. 
158. & EPA S h s  E f f i  to Esh6hh Clean Water Act Tradinghgram, Inside EPA, Sept. 12, 
1997, (Weekly Report), at 11. 
159. The present statuto~y framework was enacted in 1972 as the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). FWPCA was 
substantially amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95217, 91 Stat. 1566 
(1977), which provided that This  Act may be cited as the 'Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act' (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act)." The Clean Water Act (Clean Water 
Act) appellation will be used in this article. The Act has been amended several other times, 
most significantly by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987). 
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charge of pollutants into the Nation's waters.lbO The Act essentially 
prohibits the discharge of pollutants'61 into our Nation's waters un- 
less done in conformance with a federal or state permit under the 
National Pollutant Elimination Discharge System (NPDES).16' 
Standards are established to govern the issuance of permits, along 
with a regulatory scheme for implementing the program.'69 That 
scheme includes enforcement mechanisms,lM and the opportunity 
for citizen input.'= In contrast to the Clean Air Act, there are no 
explicit provisions in the Clean Water Act for pollution trading.'66 
Moreover, there is a clear requirement both to meet health-based 
water quality standards and to apply maximum technological con- 
trols,'" with few opportunities to take cost into account.'68 But if 
160. Clean Water Act 5 101,33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1),(2). 
161. Clean Water Act § 301,33 U.S.C. § 1311. The term "discharge of pollutants" means 
the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. Point source is de- 
fined to generally encompass pipes and other 'discrete" conveyances, but not runoff. Clean 
Water Act 5 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); set supra note 18. Navigable waters is defined in 
the Act as waters of the United States, Clean Water Act 5 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), and 
further defined in EPA regulations to include all waters susceptible to use in interstate or  
foreign commerce. 40 C.F.R 122.2. When enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress stated 
that it fully intended "that the term navigable waters be given the broadest possible constitu- 
tional interpretation." House Consideration of the Conference Committee, October 4, 
1972, reprinted in 1972 Legislative History 251 (1973) (statement of Rep Dingell, a princi- 
ple sponsor of the bill). &United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985). 
162. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342. The NPDES system focuses on point 
sources; with limited exceptions, such runoff from industrial sites or the streets of larger cit- 
ies, nonpoint source pollution is essentially unregulated under the Act. &Clean Water Act 
§ 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p). 
163. Congress recognized the important role of the states in water quality protection, see 
Clean Water Act 3 101 (b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251 (b), and provided for delegation of the wastewa- 
ter discharge permit program to the states. Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
164. Clean Water Act 8 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (government enforcement); Clean Water 
Act § 505.33 U.S.C. § 1365 (citizen suits). 
165. Scc, e.g., Clean Water Act 8 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. 8 1342(b)(3) (public notice and 
hearing on proposed permits). 
166. EPA regulations do allow limited internal facility trading, or  bubbling, for iron and 
steel manufacturing point sources, but not if the resulting discharge would violate applica- 
ble water quality standards. 40 C.F.R 5 420.03. 
167. Under the Act, increasingly stringent technology controls are imposed over time, 
forcing the development of new technologies. See Clean Water Act 5 301 (b), 33 U.S.C. 5 
1311(b). 
168. Consideration of costs can play a limited role in establishing technology standards 
under the Act The total cost of best practicable technology (BPT) controls must not be 
'wholly disproportionate" to the benefits, Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 870 
F.2d 177 (5" Cir. 1989); Weyerhaueser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Clean 
Water Act 55 301(b)(l)(A), 304(b)(l), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b) (b)(l)(A), 1314(b)(l), and 
the costs of controlling conventional pollutants by industry and sewage treatment plants 
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these important strictures are met, room for trading within the 
confines of the Act still exists.I6' 
The necessity of complying with an existing regulatory program 
complicates, but does not preclude, a trading program. Any emis- 
sions trading program must generally be based on some type of 
pollution abatement regulato~y program designed to control emis- 
sions. In general, that control may either be exerted directly 
through emission standards, or indirectly through technology re- 
quirements.'" Under the Clean Water Act, emission limitations 
embedded in the NPDES permit can serve as the trading bench- 
rnarkl7' and the flexibility inherent in the TMDL process allows 
trading to be used as one method of al locati~n. '~ 
In analyzing the provisions of the Clean Water Act which affect a 
trading program it is useful to focus on four areas: standards (both 
for technology and water quality), permits, enforcement, and citi- 
zen participation. 
should be comparable. Clean Water Act 55 301(b)(2)(E), 304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. $5 
13ll(b)(l)(E), 1314(b)(4). Cost is one of the factors which may be taken into account in 
setting best available technology (BAT), 55 301(b)(2) (A), (C), (D), (E), 304(b)(2), 33 
U.S.C. 55 l311(b) (2)(A), (C), (D), (E), 1314(b)(2), and standards of performance for new 
sources, Clean Water Act 5 306(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1316(b) (1) (B), but only to determine 
whether the standards are economically achievable. Sw Rybachek v. EPA. 904 F.2d 1276 (9* 
Cir. 1990). 
169. Water quality standards and technology controls arguably reflect two different regu- 
latory philosophies; the former has been described as economically based, the latter as ethi- 
cally based. 2 W. RODCERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER 5 4.1, at 12-16. Water qual- 
ity standards assume that water may legitimately be polluted to a "reasonable" extent in 
order to achieve an economic good. The 'moralist" view, on the other hand, would hold 
pollution as fundamentally wrong, and favor maximum limitations on pollution. Sw id The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act originally adopted water quality standards as its control 
mechanism, but the dismal history of accomplishment led Congress to adopt technology 
based controls in the Clean Water Act as a more practical method of achieving the statutes 
goals. Since 1972 it has been the national goal to reduce the discharges of pollutants to the 
Nation's waters to zero. Clean Water Act 5 101(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251 (a) (1). Scc also 
E m .  LAW INST., CLEAN WATER DESK BOOK 9 & n. 98 (1991) (discussion of regulatory con- 
sequences of philosophies). 
170. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RPSOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 55, at 
410. Sec also HAHN, PRIMER, supra note 11, at 50. 
171. Id. 
172. The statute and regulations dictate how the TMDL must be established, but are silent 
as to allocation. Clean Water Act 5 301(d)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(l)(C); 40 C.F.R § 
130.7. Another area of flexibility relevant to a trading program arises in regard to nonpoint 
sources. The Act deals with this type of pollution through planning mechanisms and volun- 
tary programs, not under the regulatory provisions. Sec Clean Water Act 55 208, 319, 33 
U.S.C. 55 1288, 1329. This provides substantial room to shape -ding programs dealing 
only with nonpoint sources, and leeway in designing point/nonpoint trading. 
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A. Standards 
To achieve the goal of protecting the Nation's waters, Congress 
established two types of standards under the Clean Water Act, both 
of which must be employed in issuing discharge permits under the 
NPDES program. The first are the so-called technology standards, 
which control how much pollutants may be discharged by various 
categories of dischargers.'" The second are water quality stan- 
dards, which dictate the level of pollutants that may be resent in a P 
water body without impairing the quality of the water.' ' Both are 
used to establish final effluent limitations for a discharger.175 
1. Technology Based Standards 
Technology based categorical effluent standards form the back- 
bone of the Clean Water Act. Technology based means that the 
discharger must achieve the same pollutant reduction levels as can 
176 be attained using a specified technology. These standards are 
devised by the EPA as national discharge limits for various catego- 
ries of industrie~"~ and must be complied with regardless of the 
quality of the receiving water.17' In the case of sewage .treatment 
173. SecClean Water Act 55 301,304,306,33 U.S.C. 5 1311,1314,1316. These standards 
may only be waived under certain narrowly defined circumstances. Sw Clean Water Act $5 
3ol(g)-(i), (k), (m), (n), & (p), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311 (g)-(i). (k), (m), (n), & (p). 
174. Sec Clean Water Act § 301 (b) (1) (c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311 (b) (1) (C); Clean Water Act 5 
303,33 U.S.C. 5 1313. 
175. Clean Water Act § 301 (b) ( I )  (C), 33 U.S.C. § 301 (b) (1) (C). 
176. Although based on a specific technology, this is a performance standard. 
177. &Clean Water Act §§ 304(b), 306, 33 U.S.C.§§ 1314(b), 1316. Effluent limitations 
are generally specified in permits in terms of both mass and concentration, although federal 
regulations require only the former. Sec 40 C.F.R § 122.45(f). At least one author has sug- 
gested that concentration limits inhibit a trading program, see Teitz, Assessing Point SUUTCC 
Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in Gmtrolling Selenium LXschatges lo the San Frantisco Bay 
Es fua~~ ,  supra note 151, at 105106, but they are extremely important ecologically since they 
dilute the discharges and prevent high loadings in a short period of time from acutely de- 
grading water quality. 
178. Sec Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (1) (C); EPA v. California, 
426 U.S. 200 (1976). The Act originally required sources other than sewage treatment 
plants to apply the 'best practicable control technology", or BFT, Clean Water Act § 
301 (b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 301 (b) (1) (A), but BPT was largely superceded by more stringent 
standards. Existing sources other than publicly owned sewage treatment works must now 
apply 'best conventional pollutant control technology (BCT)" to conventional pollutants 
such as biological oxygen demand, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH. Clean Water 
Act § 301(b)(2) (E), 33 U.S:C. § 131l(b)(2)(~) ;  Clean Water Act 5 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 
1314(a)(4). Toxics and nonconventional pollutants must be controlled by the 'best avail- 
able technology (BAT)." Clean Water Act § 301 (b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (2)(A); su 
Clean Water Act 5 304(b)(Z)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(Z)(A). New dischargen must meet 
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plants, the applicable technology standard is called "secondary 
treatment,"Im and it is the general standard for treatment plants. 
Although a requirement that minimum technology -levels be 
achieved may reduce' the market scope in a trading program to 
some extent,Is0 it provides a national uniformity and a minimum 
even more stringent standards of performance. &Clean Water Act 5 306(a) (I),  33 U.S.C. 5 
1316(a) (1). 
179. Clean Water Act § 301 (b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 131 1 (b) (1) (B); su Clean Water Act 5 
304(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d). Sewage treatment plants typically are designed to treat the 
types of pollutants found in human waste, which include biochemical oxygen demanding 
pollutants (BOD) such as nitrogen, along with suspended solids(SS), and pH. Secondary 
treatment is defined by EPA regulations as a removal rate of at least 85% for BOD and SS; 
the 3May average may not exceed 30 milligrams/liter, and the 7day average may not ex- 
ceed 45mg/l. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102(a),(b). The pH of the discharge must be between 6.0 and 
9.0.40 C.F.R 5 133.102(c). 
180. & Elise Fulstone, E $ w t  Trading: Legal Constraints on the Implnnmtation of Market- 
Bared E $ m t  Trading Program Under the Clean Water Act, 1 Envtl. Law 459, 474, 47880 
(1995). The author identifies what she considers to be a number of obstacles to effluent 
trading imposed by the Clean Water Act's current regime. Regarding the technological- 
based requirements of the C.WA, she asserts that they limit the amount of pollutant load 
available for trading and the numbei of trading participants, thereby reducing the potential 
for cost-savings. She argues that national standardsare not costefficient because they ignore 
local environmental variables, and that variances should be allowed so that dischargers 
might meet their individual technology based effluent limitations through trading. Id at 
47880. & also Ackehan & Stewart 1988, supra note 12, at 1335-40. Thisview reflects a 
negative view of technology-based standards that is not necessarily shared by all who have 
analyzed the issue. 
Environmental regulatoly schemes generally use one of three approaches to redressing 
pollution problems. They have been described as harm-based standards, technology-based 
standards, or individualized cost-benefit analysis. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Adminis- 
trative Incentives, and the N m  C h n  Air Act, 21 E m .  L. 1647, 1659-60 (1991) [hereinafter 
Latin, Regulatoly Failure]. Harm-based standards require the regulatory agency to determine 
what level of environmental impact is acceptable, and to impose whatever controls are nec- 
essary to achieve that level. &, e.g., Clean Water Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317. Technology- 
based standards instead require a certain level of technological control to be imposed, with- 
out being linked to the environmental result of the controls. &, rg . ,  Clean Water Act § 
301 (b) (2) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 131 1 (b) (2) (A). A cost-benefit analysis approach may involve 
both. &Latin, Regulatory Failure, supra While harm-based standards may appear to be more 
likely to result in achievement of environmental goals, in actuality they have had limited 
success. They are difficult to establish and administer, and often lead to inaction on the part 
of regulatory officials. Technology standards, while presenting difficulties of their own, are 
more administmtively feasible, and thus more likely to be employed and enforced. Id at 
1662-63. Technology standards are especially important in a national program since they 
decrease the likelihood that indusaies will attempt to locate in areas with lower environ- 
mental standards or create "pollution havens." & Howard Latin, Ideal v m  Real Regulatoly 
E f f i :  Implementation of U n i f m  Shndardr and Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Ref-, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1267, 1271 (1985). Other advantages noted by Professor Latin include greater consis- 
tency and predictability of results, increased likelihood that regulations will withstand judi- 
cial review, and decreased information collection and evaluation costs. Id 
Cost-benefit approaches also present problems in implementation, and may overly empha- 
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level of control that has long been. a key consideration under the 
AC~.'" In addition, as stated by the Agency in explaining its inclu- 
sion as the first of the principles .in the DraJ Frameworft, technology 
standards also promote fairness by allowing only those sources 
which have already met a baseline contribution to water quality 
protection to benefit from trading.''' 
In the case of the Long Island Sound, the question of technol- 
ogy-based standards may not present significant difficulties, since 
most of the entities which discharge substantial quantities of nitrcl 
gen, and would thus be eligible to participate in a trading program, 
are sewage treatment plants. The technology required of these 
plants is secondary treatment, and all of the plants on the Sound 
now meet that requirement.'83 However, the Clean Water Act re- 
quires that if technology-based limitations are not sufficient to pre- 
vent a facility's discharges impairing the quality of the receiving wa- 
ter, the permitting authority must develop more stringent effluent 
limits (referred to as water quality-based effluent limitations) for 
size the cost side of the equation. They also fail to consider noneconomic values which have 
important social consequences. .See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGaxity, Not So Para- 
doxicat The Rathale Fur Techmb~Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991) (discussing 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act). 
181. While Congress has employed harm-based standards and cost-benefit analysis in pol- 
lution statutes, there has been a continuing shift to technology-based strategies. Congress' 
disenchantment with the use of harm-based water quality standards under the Clean Water 
Act led to wholesale revisions in the Act in 1972, which now relies substantially on technol- 
ogy standards, with water quality standards essentially serving as a backstop. Scc Oliver A. 
Houck, Of Bats, Birdr and BA-T: The Convergent Evolution of Enuinmmenhl Law, 63 Mrss. L.J. 
403 (1994).[hereinafter Houck, BAT]; Latin, Regulaloty Failure, supra note 180, at 1660-61. 
Scc a h  supra note 168. For a detailed discussion of the weaknesses of the water quality stan- 
dards program see ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICAC. LANDMAN, DIANE M. CAMERON, TNE CLEAN 
WATERACT: 20- LATER 119-128 (1993). 
The requirement that all water discharges meet a national engineering standard (BAT) 
has been described as 'a great innovation in environmental law,' "a radical, indeed an he- 
retical approach at the time.. . ." SccHouck, BAT, supra note 181, at417. 
182. D m  FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 24. A similar view was expressed by Professor 
Robert W. Adler when discussing the difficulties inherent in point/non-point trading. After 
noting that nonpoint sources are not subject to minimum controls, as are point sources, he 
continued, "Arguably trading will work best as an economic incentive after minimum con- 
trols are imposed on all sources, so that trading proceeds from a position of equity among 
potential uading partners." Scc Robert W. Adler. Economic Incmtiverfi Wetlands and Water 
Qualily hotation: A Public PerspcCtiue 15, American Bar Association Section of Natural Re- 
sources. Energy and Environmental Law, 26& Annual Conference on Environmental Law, 
March 1315, 1997. Environmentalists are especially concerned about weakening technol- 
ogy-based requirements in Eavor of waterquality-based standards considering the poor rec- 
ord of implementation of the latter program. Id. 
183. INTERSTATE SANITATION COMMISSION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1998). 
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that discharger and incorporate those limits into its NPDES per- 
mit.la4 Because water quality standards for dissolved oxygen are not 
being met in the Sound, additional controls beyond technology- 
based must be imposed to attain state water quality standards for 
dissolved oxygen.'85 
2. Water Quality Standards 
Unlike technology based standards which apply numerical limits 
to specific categories of dischargers, water quality standards dictate 
the quality that the ambient water in the stream, lake or other wa- 
ter body must achieve. Established pursuant to Section 303 of the 
Clean Water Act,'% they are designed to ensure that a water body 
maintains a level of quality which protects human health and the 
environment. States are required to designate water quality uses 
such as "fishable" or "recreational contact," and to set standards to 
protect those uses employing criteria established by EPA.'" 
If water quality standards are being violated in a particular body 
of water, the state is required to take certain actions to reverse the 
impairment Under section 303(d) (1) (c) of the Act, the state must 
determine the maximum amount of each offending pollutant that 
may be discharged into the water body without causing the level of 
that pollutant in the ambient water to exceed the state water qual- 
ity standard.'= This is essentially a technical and scientific en- 
184. See Clean Water Act § 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 131 1 (b) (1 (C). 
185. Connecticut and New York water quality standards for dissolved oxygen for the 
Sound are 5-6 mg/liter. &discussion, supra note 21. In addition to the POTWs, there are a 
few private industrial plants in Connecticut which have significant discharges of nitrogen to 
the Sound, although their combined discharges are only 6717 pounds a day. PHASE 111 
PROPOSAL, supra note 21, at 10. None of these plants have total nitrogen limits in their per- 
mits, although they are required to monitor for the pollutant. Personal communication with 
Kenneth W. Major, Permits, Enforcement & Remediation Division, Water Management Bu- 
reau, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (Apr. 23, 1998). Accordingly, 
there is no technology-based effluent limitation in effect. 
186. &Clean Water Act 303, 33 U.S.C. 1313. 
187. Clean Water Act 5 303(a) (3), 33 U.S.C. 5 131 (a) (3). If the water quality standard set 
by the a state does not meet EPA approval, the EPA must promulgate an appropriate stan- 
dard in its place. Clean Water Act 303(c)(3), 5 33 U.S.C. 1313(c)(3). 
As part of its water quality standards a state must have an antidegradation policy, which is 
intended to insure that water quality will not fall below its current level and that existing uses 
of a waterbody will be maintained. This applies regardless of whether the uses actually have 
been designated. See 40 C.F.R. 131.12(a) (1). If the water is cleaner than necessary to s u p  
port fishable/swimmable uses, that water quality must be maintained unless important e c e  
nomic and social goals dictate otherwise. See 40 C.F.R. 5 131.12(a) (2); DRAFT FRAMEWORK, 
supra note 61, at 2-1 
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (c). Sac D m  FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-3. The Clean 
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deavor, in which the state .may employ various tools and tech- 
niques, including monitoring and modeling.'89 The aggregate 
amount of a pollutant which can be discharged and still maintain 
water quality standards, including a margin of safety, is the "total 
maximum daily load (TMDL)."'~" The calculations to establish 
TMDLs must be made available to the public,'g' but there is no ex- 
plicit mechanism required for public input unless the proposed 
TMDLs are disapproved and EPA issues its own.'92 
Once a state determines the TMDL for a pollutant, it must allo- 
cate the total load among the various point and nonpoint dis- 
chargers on the waterb~d~. '~ '  The EPA provides little guidance on 
the manner in which the loadings are to be apportioned, and the 
194 decision is essentially a matter of state policy. After an allocation 
has been made to a discharger, it is used to calculate an effluent 
discharge limit for the pollutant at issue, which will be more strin- 
Water Act envisions a federalstate partnership. Within the federal regulatoly framework 
states may choose to administer substantial portions of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 402(b). 
Both Connecticut and New York have been delegated such responsibility, and both have 
adopted water quality standards for various pollutants, including dissolved oxygen. See supra 
note 21. 
189. 40 C.F.R § 130.7(a). 
190. Clean Water Act Section 303 (d) (1) (C) provides that each state shall establish: 
the total maximum daily load, for those pollutants which the Administrator identi- 
fies.. . as suitable for such calculation. Such load shall be established at a level neces 
sary to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a 
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the rela- 
- 
tionship between effluent limitations and water quality. . 
33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d) (1) (C). 
191. 40 C.F.R 5 130.7(c) (1) (ii). 
192. 40 C.F.R. 9 130.7(d) (2). 
193. The allocations given to point source dischargers for their waste streams are de- 
nominated waste load allocations (WLAs); the allocahons for nonpoint sources are called 
load alloc&ons (LAs). Identifying nonpoint sources and measuring their contribution to 
the pollution problem can pose substantial difficulties, especially when some of the pollut- 
ant loading derives from air sources. Controlling nonpoint sources is even more problem- 
atic. In practice, the states often calculate as best they can the overall pollutant contribution 
from all nonpoint sources, as well as from natural sources, and subtract it from the total pol- 
lutant loading that will be allowed. The balance is then allocated among the various point 
sources. 
194. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water 
Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 E m .  L. REP. ( E m .  L. INST.) 
10391,10398 (1997) [hereinafter Houck, TMDLs]. Professor Houck notes that the Act con- 
tains no explicit language actually requiring implementation of the TMDLs, and that the 
Agency may be left to its authority to review and reject TMDLs, see C.WA § 303(d) (2), 33 
U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2), bolstered by its supenision of the permit system. Id at 10399. This 
raises a question about the strength of the Agency's ability to force implementation of 
TMDLs involving nonpoint sources, since these sources are not regulated under the Act: Id 
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gent than the limits dictated by the technology standards.Ig5 The 
TMDL process is one which focuses on overall pollutant loadings 
and seeks to allocate control responsibility.'" Thus it lends itself 
readily to a program in which the responsibility might be shifted 
among dischargers through a market me~hanism.'~' 
In the case of the Sound, the states have essentially approached 
the Sound-wide loading determination on a macrescale, having 
calculated the amount of yearly reduction that will be necessary 
from the 1990 baseline, and thus the "total maximum yearly load- 
ing."lg8 The targeted reduction of 58.5 percent has been evenly dis- 
tributed among the management zones established by the LISS, 
and maximum loadings will have to be set for each plant, first on a 
yearly basis, and then reduced to monthly and/or daily limits.Ig9 To 
comply with the Clean Water Act, a formal TMDL process meeting 
the requirements of Clean Water Act Section 303(d) must be fol- 
lowed by each state, and the basic calculations for each plant must 
be done.''' The loading allocations will be converted into effluent 
195. Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. 5 131 1 (b) (1) (C). 
196. The TMDL process can be viewed in itself as a type of trading program, in which the 
state rather than the market makes the allocations. It is essentially a closed type of system, 
since a new source or  new discharger will not be allowed to discharge unless "there are suffi- 
dent remaining pollutant load allocations to allow for the discharge." 40 C.F.R 5 
1224(i)(l). Existing dischargers are supposed to be subject to compliance schedules de- 
signed to achieve applicable water quality standards. 40 C.F.R 122.4(i) (2). It appears that 
this requirement has been honored in the breach. 
197. One potential impediment is the poor progress which has actually been made in 
TMDL implementation. Few states have actually established adequate TMDLs for their wa- 
ters, and those which have still failed to carry out meaningful allocations. This failure to 
comply with the requirements of the Act has led to a series-of lawsuits brought by environ- 
mental organizations around the counuy. See, c.6, Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 
865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 
1996); Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991); 
Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), a f d  sub 
nom Alaska Center for the Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9" Cir. 1994); Scott v. City 
of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 288(N.D. Ill. 1981), a f d  in part, reu'd in part, 741 F.2d 992,996 
(7" Cir. 1984), cerf. h i e d ,  469 U.S. 1196 (1985); sec also Houck, TMDLr, supra note 194, at 
1039310396. r\s of September 1997, there were nine states with respect to whi;h EPA is un- 
der court order to establish TMDLs if the states do not do so; twelve states in which litigation 
is pending; and 5 states with respect to which citizens groups have filed notices of intent to 
sue. EPA, Office of Water, TMDL Litigation By State, (visited Apr. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tdml/lawsuitl.hrml >. 
198. The loading must of course accurately represent the reductions necessary to achieve 
water quality standards, which is not assumed. Seesupra note 54 and infia note 225. 
199. See40 C.F.R. 5 122.45(d)(l). 
200. A survey conducted by EPA found TMDL cost estimates as high as $1 million. OFFICE 
OF WATER, EPA, TMDL DEVELOPMENT Cow ESTIMATES: CASE STUDIES OF 14 TMDLs, EPA-R- 
96401 13, Fig. 4 (1996). (visited Apr. 15, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/ 
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limitations incorporated in the NPDES permits. They thus will 
serve as the baseline for a trading program. 
The Long Island Sound dissolved oxygen target is based on 
achieving and maintaining desired levels in the most stressed parts 
of the Sound. The allocation of loadings is designed to distribute 
the loadings fairly across all zones and dischargers. However, a dis- 
charger which is within its overall limit still may have a substantial 
impact upon local water quality. It is possible, therefore, that some 
plants may be required to meet even more stringent limits than 
dictated by the 58.5 percent reduction goal because their dis- 
charges are or would contribute to localized water quality prob- 
lems, creating "hot spots." Plants in such a situation present prob- 
lems in any trading program, but are especially troublesome for 
water programs, since most discharge to relatively confined bodies 
of water. These plants should be required to meet their specified 
effluent discharge limitations, and not be permitted to purchase 
credits to achieve c ~ m ~ l i a n c e . ~ '  However, to the extent a source 
controls its discharge to a level lower than required by water quality 
considerations, it could be allowed to sell the increment. 
The ultimate goal of the Clean Water Act is to eliminate the dis- 
charge of pollutants to our Nation's waters,2M and the entire struc- 
ture of the Act is designed to require increasingly stringent tech- 
nology limits, with the safety net of water quality standards. To be 
faithful to both the language and the intent of the Act, any trading 
program must be constructed in a way which advances towards the 
goal. It is critical, therefore, that the trading baselines established, 
which are contingent upon water quality standards, areas accurate 
as possible, a problem when limitations are based on modeling, an 
imprecise science. Moreover, monitoring must be thorough and 
extensive to insure that reductions actually occur as claimed and 
OWOW/tdml/tmdlcost.html>. These costs are borne by the public, and should be consid- 
ered in any discussion of uansaction costs of developing a pollution trading program. In 
addition, it has been suggested that the analysis costs to the plant or  permit writer of review- 
ing a trade or the effort involved in revising a TMDL or wasteload allocation due to new data 
could be an impediment to trading. WEF, Comments on Draft Framework for Water- 
shed-Based Trading. supra note 154. at 67.  
201. The situation is similar under the Clean Air Act, since the Act does not relieve a dis- 
charger from complying with the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for S02. 
In that regard, localized impacts of water discharges, which are usually into relatively con- 
fined waters, may be more severe than air emissions which tend to disperse more widely. 
Members of the Long Island Sound Ad Hoc Trading Group have generally agreed that trad- 
ing should not be allowed when it contributes to local water quality impairment. 
202. Clean Water Act 5 101(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l). 
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that water quality is not endangered. But meeting water quality 
standards will only achieve the fishable/swimmable goal of the Act; 
therefore, to reach the goal of eliminating discharges, a trading 
program should also contain successively more stringent reduction 
requirements. 
B. Implementation 
1. Permits 
The primary implementing mechanism of the Clean Water Act is 
the NPDES permit. Along with a variety of other requirements, it 
prescribes the permit holder's effluent discharge limitations based 
on both technology and water quality standards.203 The permit may 
be issued for no more than five years:M and provides that the issu- 
ing authority, typically the state? may reopen the permit under 
specified ~onditions."~ When issuing a permit, the state must pro- 
vide for public input, including opportunity to challenge the per- 
mit.''' Modifying a permit requires that similar procedures be fol- 
lowed, unless, under the regulations, the modification is deemed 
minor.''' Since changes in effluent limitations, in most instances, 
203. Conditions applicable to all permits include requirements for proper operation and 
maintenance, inspection and entry, monitoring and record keeping and reporting, 40 
C.F.R 5 122.41, as well as compliance with both water quality and technology based stan- 
dards. 40 C.F.R 5 122.44. The regulations make it explicit that a permit may not be issued 
"[wlhen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water 
quality requirements of all affected States[.]" 40 C.F.R 5 122.4(d). 
204. Clean Water Act 5 402(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b) (1) (B). 
205. Authority to administer the Clean Water Act has been delegated to both Connecticut 
and New York pursuant to Clean Water Act 5 402(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b). See supra note 
164. 
206. 40 C.F.R 5 122.41(f); 40 C.F.R 5 122.44(c). The reasons for which a permit may be 
modified are spelled out at 40 C.F.R 5 122.62(a). There is not an obvious one within which 
a modification-due to a trading program would fit, although this is apparently being done in 
at least one trading program. See Teitz, A m ' n g  Point Source Dircharge Permit Trading: Case 
Study in Controlling Sclmiurn Dirchargcs lo the San Rancisco Bay Estuary, supra note 151, at 11 1 & 
n.188. 
207. Clean Water Act 5 101(e), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(e) (public participation in implement 
Act encouraged; states must develop regulations); Clean Water Act 5 402(b) (3). 33 U.S.C. 5 
1342(b)(3) (state must provide opportunity for public hearing on proposed state permit); 
40 C.F.R $5 124.10-12, 124.17 (public notice and comment, hearings, agency duty to re- 
spond to comments). See also 40 C.F.R § 123.30 (judicial review must be the same as that 
available to obtain judicial review in federal court of a federally-issued NPDES permit; see 
Clean Water Act $ 509,33 U.S.C. 5 1369). 
208. See 40 C.F.R 5 122.62. 
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will always be major,P0g a draft permit must be issued and the public 
participation procedures and other applicable state or federal 
regulations must be followed.210 Accordingly, modification of a 
permit may take a minimum of several months to complete, which 
could pose an impediment to trading effluent rights readily and 
with minimal transaction costs.211 This issue is discussed in more 
detail in the analysis of the anti-backsliding restriction below. 
An emissions trading program places substantial reliance on the 
discharge permits and inventories, so to the extent those are defi- 
cient, water quality may not be prote~ted.~ '~ Facilities which have 
actual levels of discharges substantially below permitted levels 
would find themselves with a trading opportunity which, if ex- 
ploited, could degrade water quality.213 Accordingly, strict attention 
must be paid to defining the trading baselines or benchmarks in- 
corporated into the program, and to the corresponding monitor- 
ing.'14 Because of the complications introduced by interfacility 
trading, it is likely that both effluent and ambient water monitoring 
will need to be increased in order to assure that reductions are ac- 
tually taking place, and that localized impacts are not created. 
209. Minor modifications we smctly limited to such matters as correcting typographical 
errors, reflecting changed ownership, requiring more frequent monitoring, changing cer- 
tain schedules and other ministerial type actions, none of which relate to substantive 
changes in effluent limitations. Sec40 C.F.R. 5 122.63. 
210. 40 C.F.R 5 122.62. The public notice and comment period, and possible public 
hearing may take several months. See 40 C.F.R $5 124.10-12. Nevertheless, it is a crucial 
element of Clean Water Act implementation. 
211. This was apparently a problem in the Fox River trading program discussed in the 
following section. Sec inj5a Part V, A. The Water Environment Federation has suggested that 
reopener clauses create market uncertainly, since a permittee cannot be sure that its permit 
requirements will be unchanged for the duration of the permit. The Federation suggests 
that some minimum time period be established during which the discharge limitation s u b  
ject to trading will not be changed,'in order to foster market certainty. See WEF, Comments 
on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, supra note 154, at 10. 
212. &TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 55, 
at411. 
213. This situation is not an unusual one, since facilities often discharge below their per- 
mitted levels. This may occur because the effluent limitations are categorical ones estab 
lished for the industry as a whole, and not for the individual plant, or  because the facility is 
being operated conservatively in order to assure compliance and avoid penalties. Unlike 
effluent discharge limitations for industrial sources, which are calculated based upon a rea- 
sonable measur; of actual production, limitations for POTWs are calculated based on de- 
sign flow, not actual discharge levels. 40 C.F.R. 5 122.45(b) (1991). 
214. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, s u p  note 55, at 
411. 
Heinonline - -  23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 7 8  1 9 9 8  
19981 Reducing Nitrogen Pollution 179 
2. An ti-backsliding. 
In order to achieve the no discharge goal established in the 
Clean Water Congress inserted into the Act an increasingly 
stringent set of technology requirements, and prohibited easing of 
most effluent discharge limitations once they had been incorpo- 
rated into a permit.216 Thus, Clean Water Act § 402(0) (1) bars the 
renewal, reissuance or modification of a permit which contains an 
effluent limitation that is less stringent than those contained in the 
217 previous permit. This basic proscription is consonant with both 
the scheme of increasingly stringent discharge requirements, and 
the overall technology forcing theme of the Act."' Accordingly, 
the Act is most strict when the effluent limitation in question is 
based on technology, rather than water quality considerations. In 
the former situation, the discharge limitations may not be relaxed 
in an existing permit, even if new technology based effluent guide- 
lines are issued which would othenvise allow a more generous dis- 
charge limit. 219 
The requirements of the Act are somewhat less strict when a 
permittee's effluent limitations are water quality rather than tech- 
nology based.=' In that event, backsliding may occur in two situa- 
tions. First, pursuant to section 402(2), if water quality standards 
are not being achieved, but a new TMDL and wasteload allocation 
has been accomplished whereby the cumulative effect of the re- 
vised loadings will result in lower total pollutant loadings and will 
ensure that water quality standards will be attained, then a reissued 
permit may contain less stringent limits.=' In essence, the loading 
215. Clean Water Act 101 (a) (I), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1). 
216. Clean Water Act 402(0), 33 U.S.C. 1342(0). 
217. 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(0)(1); scc40 C.F.R 122.44(1). 
218. See, e.g., Clean Water Act 5 301 (b). . 
219. Clean Water Act 5 402(0)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1342(0)(1); see 40 C.F.R § 122.44(1). 
There are certain exceptions, such as for plant alterations or for technical mistakes o r  mis- 
takes of law made in issuing the permit. Clean Water Act 35 402(o) (2) (A)-(E), 33 U.S.C. s§ 
1342 (0) (2) (A)-(E); 40 C.F.R 122.44(1) (2) (i) (A)-(E). If the permittee has installed and is 
properly operating and maintaining the appropriate technology, and is meeting current 
effluent guideline requirements but cannot mekt the more suGgent requirements of the 
permit, Clean Water Act $402(o) (2) (E) allows the limits to be relaxed to the level which the 
plant is actually attaining. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o) (2) (E); 40 C.F.R 122.44(1) (2) (i) (E). 
220. However, technical mistakes or  mistaken interpretations of law made when issuing 
the permit, which may allow backsliding from a technology based permit, d o  not apply to 
water quality based permits. See Clean Water Act § 402(0)(2)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C. 
1342 (0) (2) (B) (ii). 
221. Clean Water Act 402(0)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(0)(2)(B); scc Clean Water Act 5 
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has been reallocated during the process and another discharger 
will be reducing its loadings to c ~ m ~ e n s a t e . ~  In the second situa- 
tion, if a waterbody is attaining water quality standards, the permit- 
tee's water quality based effluent limitations may be reduced only 
following compliance with the antidegradation policy established 
under the A C ~ . ~ '  Overall, the statute makes it explicit that no per- 
mit may be renewed, reissued, or modified if the effluent limita- 
tions do not meet current technology-based effluent guidelines and 
assure that applicable water quality standards are achieved.n4 
Similar to the issue of whether a trade would constitute a permit 
modification, the applicability of the backsliding prohibition may 
present problems for a trading program. Assuming a plant is given 
a specific pollutant loading limitation in its permit, but complies 
with that limit by purchasing credits, has it, in effect, been allowed 
to backslide to a less stringent limitation? This may be especially 
problematical if the permit is actually altered to reflect the argua- 
bly "less stringent" limit and the credit purchase. However, a close 
analysis of the statutory scheme and implementing regulations sug- 
gests that this provision could be addressed in a manner that will 
keep it from being a major impediment to nitrogen trading on the 
Sound. 
First, if a changed permit limitation based on a trade is deemed 
to fall within the scope of the anti-backsliding prohibition, it may 
still be allowed if it comes within one of the narrowly circum- 
scribed exceptions spelled out in the statute. As discussed above, 
the technology standard applicable to sewage treatment plants is 
secondary treatment, with which all of the relevant plants are in 
303(d) (4) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313 (d) (4) (A). Section 303 was revised in 1987 to prohibit revi- 
sion of a TMDL unless all designated uses will be attained. Water Quality Act of 1987, 5 
404(b), Pub. L. NO. 100-4,101 Stat.7.68 (1987). 
222. One further situation in which water quality based effluent limitations may be re- 
duced when the standards are not being attained arises when a designated use has been 
eliminated. Clean Water Act 5 303(d)(4)(A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313 (d)(4)(A). The circum- 
stances under which a state may remove designated use are quite limited. Sex 40 C.F.R 5 
131.10(h). 
223. Clean Water Act 5 402(0) (I) ,  33 U.S.C. 5 1342(o) (1); sec40 C.F.R 5 122.44(1) (2) (ii). 
See alro DRAFT FRAMEWORK, mpTa note 61, at 2-3. Each state is also required to establish an 
antidegradation policy to protect water quality. It must comply with minimum requirements 
established by EPA. 40 C.F.R 5 131.12; su, ag., New York State Department of Environ- 
mental Conservation, Organization and Delegation Memorandum No. 8540, Water Quality 
Antidegradation Policy, September 9,1985 
224. Clean Water Act 5 402(0) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(0) (3). 
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compliance.255 Nitrogen limits in the plants' permits will accord- 
ingly be based on water quality considerations. It may be argued 
that the formal TMDLs to be prepared by Connecticut and New 
York for the Sound will allow the states to relax individual permit 
limits, since the cumulative effect of all the sewage treatment plant 
permit revisions will result "in a decrease in the amount of 
rr 226 [nitrogen] discharged to the [Sound] and "will assure the at- 
tainment of [the applicable] water quality ~tandard."~' Although 
this is appealing on its face, one factual complication does arise. 
Based on LISS modeling efforts, it is not at all certain that dissolved 
oxygen goals can be achieved even if the full 58.5 percent reduc- 
tion is achieved sound-wide.=' Moreover, both the interim and 
long-term goals established in the Management Plan are not re- 
garded as ~ ~ c i e n t l y  stringent to meet current state water quality 
~ t a n d a r d s . ~  But if that is indeed the situation, then the TMDL 
would appear to be insuflicient from the beginning, calling into 
question the legality of the entire procedure. 
In the final analysis, the antibacksliding issue can be avoided in 
large part, since very few dischargers now have actual nitrogen 
limitations in their permits, and steps could be taken to assure that 
any new or reissued permits are drafted in such a fashion as to spe- 
cifically avoid the problem. Permit writers have substantial latitude 
in defining the terms of a permit, so long as the statute and regula- 
tions are observed. For instance, a permit might be written to spec- 
ify that, provided the requisite technology based limitations and lo- 
calized water quality limitations were met:90 the effluent limitations 
specified in the permit could be achieved either by actual reduc- 
tions at the plant, or through the purchase of allowances or as an 
alternative method of compliance."' By careful attention to the 
225. Secsupro Partlv, A, 1. 
226. Clean Water Act 5 402(0) (2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1842(0) (2). 
227. Clean Water Act 5 303(d) (4) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d) (4) (A). 
228. PHASE 111 PROPOSAL, supra note 21. at 9. The situation is further complicated since 
EPA is in the process of developing regional marine oxygen criteria to deal with nutrients. 
- - 
These may lead to changes in state water quality criteria. -1d at 15; EPA to Deucfop New Water 
@lily Crileriajor Nutrimts, INSIDE EPA, Oct. 10,1997, (Weekly Report), at 1-2. 
229. Sec supra notes 49. 
230. Obviously trading to improve the water quality in the Sound should not be allowed 
to cause local water quality impairment. 
231. The prohibition on discharges found in Section 301 (b)(l)(C) of the Clean Water 
Act provides that effluent limitations must be sufficiently stringent to "meet water quality 
standards.. . established pursuant to any State law or regulations." Arguably a trading p r e  
gram will only be approved if the states [and EPA] determine that the total impact of all in- 
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language of the permits, the potential impediments inherent in the 
anti-backsliding provisions of the Act might be avoided. Questions 
of enforceability may nevertheless be raised, to which we turn next. 
3. Enforcement. 
From the inception of the Clean Water Act, enforcement has 
played a key role in assuring that statutory and regulatory require- 
ments were met and water quality protected. Section 309 of the 
~ c e ~ ~ c o n t a i n s  both civil and criminal sanctions and provides a 
powehl  tool to force compliance by dischargers. Similar provi- 
sions are found at the state Congress empowered citizens 
to bring enforcement actions to both stimulate and supplement 
the efforts of the government:94 and it has been citizens who have 
been responsible for many compliance suits.435 The cornerstone of 
Clean Water Act enforcement, both for the government and for 
citizens, is the system of self-monitoring and reporting established 
by statute and by regulation.296 Section 308 of the Act requires the 
permit holder to install and maintain appropriate equipment to 
sample and monitor its effluent, establish and maintain records of 
the results, and report them to the permitting agency.237 Discharge 
monitoring reports (DMRs), required to be filed at prescribed in- 
tervals which detail the level of compliance achieved for the speci- 
fied effluent limitations,238 are key to facility of oversight and en- 
dividual limitations will be to maintain or improve water quality, thus meeting the 
letter and the intent of the lay. 
232. 33 U.S.C. 5 1319. 
233. For an examination of the tensions inherent in the federaistate'partnership see 
David R Hodas, Enfmcement Of Enuironmtal Law In A Triangular Federal System: Can Three 
. Not Be A C m d  When Enfmcement Authority Is Shared By The United States, The States And Their 
Citirenr? 54 MD. L. REV. 1552 (1995). 
234. Clean Water Act 5 505,33 U.S.C. 5 1365. For background on federal citizen suit pro- 
visions see JEFFREY G. MILLER , ENVTL. L. INST., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE NFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL AWS (1987); see also MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CITIZEN SUITS (1991). 
235. See Adam Babich, Citixen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 
( E m .  L. INST.) 10,141 (1995); see also DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, 
CMLANLI CRIMINAL 5 15.03[1] (1996). 
236. &Clean Water Act 5 308,33 U.S.C. 5 1318; 40 C.F.R 55 122.41(j), 122.44(i), 122.48. 
237. Clean Water Act 5 308(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1318(a). 
238. &40 C.F.R 5 122.41(1) (4). The reporting frequency may be determined on a case- 
bycase basis, as appropriate for the nature and effect of the discharge, but in no case may it 
be less than once a year. 40 C.F.R 5 122.44(i) (3). In practice, reporting is much more fre- 
quent. Permit holders must also report within 24 hours any discharge which may endanger 
health or  the environment. 40 C.F.R 5 122.41 (1) (6). 
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for~ement. '~~ If the actual discharge exceeds that specified in the 
permit, then the DMR provides prima facie evidence of a violation 
of the statute, and strict liability will be imposed on the permit- 
tee.'" Enforcement then becomes a relatively straightfonvard mat- 
ter, based on the permit holder's own data.'" To the extent that 
permit limitations are unclear, enforcement will be impeded.'"' 
A transaction between point sources can be reasonably accom- 
modated within the current permit process. The same technology 
and water quality based effluent limitations which would be im- 
posed in the absence of a trading program should be included, 
with the permit written to specify the level of discharge limitation 
necessary to meet technology based standards, and any additional 
increment required by water quality. The need to prevent local- 
ized water quality impacts would be taken into account at this point 
in setting effluent limits. The permit would then explicitly recog- 
nize that the permit holder might achieve the requisite water qual- 
ity based effluent limitations either by actually reducing its load- 
ings, or by the purchase of credits. 
When a permit with such a condition is issued, citizens will have 
the opportunity to comment and to present any arguments they 
might have against allowing compliance by trading.'" If there is 
239. SuU.S. v. CPS Chemical Co., 779 F. Supp. 437, 442 (E.D. Ark. 1991). Congress in- 
tended enforcement under the Act to be streamlined and straightforward, stating explicitly 
that the purpose of the enforcement provisions "'is to avoid the necessity of lengthy fact 
finding, investigations, and negotiations at the time of enforcement. Enforcement of viola- 
tions of requirements under this Act should be based on relatively narrow fact situations re- 
quiring a minimum of discretionary decision making or delay.'" (quoting S.Rep. No. 414, 
92"6 Cong., 1" Sess. 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, 3730). Sec 
U.S. v. Gulf Park Water Company, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1056,1060 (S.D. Miss. 1997). 
240. SuU.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 824 F. Supp. 640,649, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,558 
(E.D. Tex. 1993); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 
440,451-52,15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,785 (D. Md. 1985). 
241. SuU.S. v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 824 F. Supp. 640,648.23 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,558 
(E.D. Tex. 1993). 
242. Permit limitations which include a trading provision may also provide difficulties for 
the discharger in instances in which it wishes to avail itself of the bypass and upset provisions 
of the regulations. Su 40 C.F.R 55 122.41 (m), (n). Under these provisions a permit holder 
may be excused for bypassing treatment works or  exceeding discharge limitations in nar- 
rowly circumscribed conditions, but must make prompt notification to the permitting 
authority. 40 C.F.R $5 122.41 (m) (3) (ii), (n) (3) (iii). Unless the permit has been amended 
to show the actual effluent limitations resulting after a trade, it may be difficult for the o p  
erator to ascertain when the defense might appropriately be raised. 
243. Clean Water Act 5 402(b) (3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b) (3) (state must provide opportunity 
for public hearing on proposed state permit); 40 C.F.R $5 124.10-12. 124.17 (public notice 
and comment, hearings, agency duty to respond to comments). 
Heinonline - -  23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 183 1998 
the potential for local water quality impairment, then a challenge 
could be raised at that time and trading would be limited or re- 
fused altogether. The exact scope of the allowable trading should 
be explicitly spelled out so that once the permit is approved no fur- 
ther agency action is necessary for a trade to occur. Thus issuance 
of the permit should constitute final agency action as to allowable 
trading, and a court should find review appropriate.444 
Once trading commences, citizens should have prompt access to 
information regarding purchase and salks, as well as compliance by 
While monitoring is important in any enforcement 
program, it is even more crucial in incentive based programs since 
both discharges and trades must be tracked and correlated. 246 
Unless a permit holder can demonstrate to state authorities a 
completed transaction to purchase pollution credits, it must com- 
ply with the effluent limitations spelled out in its permit. Any ex- 
ceedances must be reported as such in the plant's DMRs. If a per- 
mit holder engages in a trading transaction, proof should be 
provided to the state, and the effluent discharge limitations recal- 
culated and either raised (buyer) or lowered (seller) in both per- 
mits to reflect that trade. A seller who fails to meet its reduction 
obligations would therefore violate its permit and be subject to 
sanctions. Its adjusted discharge limitations then become the base- 
line against which compliance with the permit and the Clean Water 
Act is measured, and enforcement undertaken. 
It is evident that such a trading scheme would require additional 
administrative work to recalculate limits based on trades and to 
make data readily available? but the process is critical to maintain- 
244. It is important to avoid situations in which a court would find that a challenge to a 
trading scheme could not be brought until an actual trade had taken place. There might be 
no mechanism for such a challenge under either federal or state law. The judicial review 
provision of the Clean Water Act, section 509, which would apply to the issuance or denial 
of a permit by EPA, does not seem to be sufficiently broad to encompass a later trade under 
the permit. Clean Water Act 5 509(b)(l) (F), 33 U.S.C. 5 1369(b) (1) (F). Nor would the citi- 
zen suit provision of the Act, which allows suits against the Administrator for failure to carry 
out a nondiscretionary duty, be applicable, even if the permit was one issued by EPA Sa 
Clean Water Act 5 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(2). The issue becomes even more prob- 
lematic under state law, since state judicial review formulations vary. Even if review was 
available, it would place an unreasonable burden on a trading program if each individual 
trade could be subjected to judicial review. 
245. A publicly available on-line data base could provide both a mechanism to facilitate 
trading &d a means for the government and citizens to monitor trading. 
246. Sa Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Sourcc Trading, supra note 62, at 65,8041. 
247. For the acid rain program, EPA maintains an on-line Allowance Tracking System 
which contains information on allowance accounts and activities. It may be found at 
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ing enforceability of the permits and the integrity of the system, 
not only for government but also for citizen  enforcer^.'^' 
Although the Clean Water Act may present some legal hurdles 
for a market based trading program, those hurdles represent im- 
portant environmental protections crafted by Congress which can- 
not be ignored. Indeed, the Act provides an essential structure for 
trading. A carefully crafted nitrogen trading program for Long Is- 
land Sound could meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act, 
and be consistent with the principles spelled out in the Draft 
Frameuork. The question then remains whether it is economically 
and politically feasible. We approach these questions by first exarn- 
ining current water trading programs. 
<http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/atsdata2.html (visited Apr. 15,1998). 
248. There is srrong concern on the part of environmentalists about the degree to which 
governmental enforcement is sufficiently vigorous. Both federal and state enforcement ef- 
forts have been criticized over the years, and citizens have brought litigation when the gov- 
ernment failed to do so. See CLEAN WATER NETWORK, A PRESCRIPTION FOR CLEAN WATER: 
HOW TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE CLEAN WATER A m  1420, Appendix (Oct. 1997) (as of 
1996, 14.5 percent of New York's and 19.5 percent of Connecticut's major indusuial and 
municipal facilities were listed by EPA as being in significant noncompliance with their 
permits); Todd Robins, Public Interest Research Group, Testimony On Environmental En- 
forcement Issues, Connecticut General Assembly, Environmental Committee, (Mar. 31, 
1997) (PIRG review found that the number of major indusuial facilities in Connecticut in 
significant noncompliance was three times the number listed by EPA). For this reason, envi- 
ronmentalists are firm that any water pollution trading programs established under the 
Clean Water Act must be structured to facilitate enforcement efforts. Sec Sierra Club, Com- 
ments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading supra note 156; Comments by the 
National Wildlife Federation on the U.S.E.PA.'s Draft Framework for Watershed-Based 
Trading, supra note 156. 
When discussing citizen participation in the Draft Framework, EPA focuses primarily on the 
benefits to be achieved from engaging stakeholders in trading processes. DRAFT 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-11. However, of critical concern to environmental public 
interest groups are the mechanisms by which citizens may participate in the formulation and 
enforcement of wastewater discharge permits. The Clean Water Act, fortified by agency 
regulations, specifically provides the right for public,comment in the issuance of a permit, 
and a right to challenge the permit once it has bee;l\issued. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (b)(3) 
(comment on state permit); 5 509(b) (challenge federal permit); 5 505 (enforcement state 
and federal permits). Section 505 of the Act further provides citizens the opportunity to 
enforce the terms and conditions of the permit 33 U.S.C. 5 1365. This provision has been 
used extensively by citizens, and has sewed to both supplement government enforcement 
efforts and to goad officials into action. Indeed, it is especially important to maintain citi- 
zens' ability to enforce compliance by public entities such as POTWs, since that has been 
unfortunately an area in which the government has often been reluctant to take action. Ac- 
cordingly, under any trading program, citizens ability to obtain information and to seek 
compliance with the law must be maintained. 
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Water pollutant trading programs in various forms have been 
undertaken in a number of geographic locations.249 Although they 
differ considerably in structure, scope, specific pollutants, trading 
partners and levels of participation, they all generally meet the re- 
quirements that EPA has specified in its Draft Framework. A review 
of several of these programs provides insight into how they fit into 
the legal framework and how they have functioned in practice, with 
some explanations. Four of the programs, all of which have re- 
ceived considerable attention, are discussed below. 
A. Fox River, Wisconsin 
The Fox River trading program, the first of its kind, was initiated 
by Wisconsin in 1981 in response to the failure of technology-based 
categorical effluent limitations to control biological oxygen de- 
mand (BOD) at two critical sites on the Fox ~iver.'~' The program 
was established as a closed point source capand-trade program, to 
include fifteen industrial facilities, mostly paper mills, and six mu- 
nicipal facilities (a balance significantly different from Long Island 
Sound). Preliminary analysis suggested that trading would allow 
point sources to realize an annual control cost savings of as much 
as $6.8 million dollars over the traditional regulatory program.s' 
Although no provision of the Clean Water Act explicitly author- 
ized trading, Wisconsin appears to have attempted to operate 
within the framework of the ~ct."' It calculated an overall BOD 
loading for the river and assigned wasteload allocations to 'the rele- 
vant point source dischargers, reflected in five-year discharge per- 
m i t ~ . ~ '  Dischargers may obtain BOD credits by reducing their pol- 
249. See DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, Appendix C. See also Surface Water Quality 
Division, Michigan ~ e ~ a r t m e n t  of Environmental Quality, Summaly o/ Other State Programs 
(visited Dec. 20, 1997) .< http://~.deq.state.mi.us/swq/uading/hrml/mtesum.htm >. 
250. For more detailed discussions of the program see DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, 
at 513; Hahn, Doctor's O r b ,  supra note 13, at 97-98. 
251. &DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 513. 
252. It has been pointed out that the manner in which the pro- is structured may not 
conform to the strictures of federal law, and the program may be vulnerable to challenge. 
See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 13, at 387. The Fox ~ i v e ~  uading regulations may be found 
at Wk. ADMIN. CODE § 212.115 (1986); xe olro id 3 212.11 (1985) (detailing the process for 
modifying or temporarily reallocating point source allocations); 3 212.40 (1996) (detailing 
the loweiFox ~ i v &  water quality related effluent limitations). 
253. SeeHahn, Doclor's Orders, supra note 13, at 97. 
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lutant loads below their respective allocations, or may purchase 
them to cover excess discharges. However, point sources may not 
trade unless they can demonstrate need, such as increased produc- 
tion or inability to achieve effluent limitations.254 
Within the State's water pollutant trading program, trades must 
last at least one year, trading transactions must be reflected in dis- 
chargers permits and may not last longer than the permit, and all 
trades must be formally approved by the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources. Because of the localized effect of BOD, the 
trading program is divided into three river segments, each with a p  
proximately an equal number of participants, with a prohibition on 
trading between the segments.255 
Although the program began in 1981, only one trade has oc- 
curred to date, and that was not the type anticipated by the propo- 
nents of the plan.256 While the objective of the program was clear 
and the allocation of pollutant credits relatively straight forward,P5? 
there were a number of factors which posed constraints on trading. 
Since most of the industrial facilities are paper mills, it is generally 
believed that competitive pressures within that industry dampened 
any willingness to trade. Moreover, given the uncertainty inherent 
in pollution control programs, the mills may well have been reluc- 
tant to trade away any portion of the BOD allocation that they may 
need to accommodate future The restriction on trading 
between stream segments also presented a problem; it meant that 
there were few available trading partners, and the overall econom- 
ics may have made trading unattractive. Additionally, the adminis- 
trative review process was described as complex and time consum- 
ing, with high transaction costs.259 
Despite the lack of trading, the various dischargers did manage 
to reduce their pollutant discharges, and BOD reductions in the 
river were achieved. However, it is plausible that employing tradi- 
254. S u D m  FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 513. One author has suggested that the ra- 
tionale for this' requirement is to assure compliance with Clean Water Act requirements 
concerning permit modifications. See Teitz, supra note 151, at 57 & n.188; 40 C.F.R § 
122.62(a). 
255. Su AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 35; Hahn, DOC~OTS Orders, supra note 13, at 
98. 
256. In this "uade," a paper mill dosed its wastewater treatment plant and moved its 
wastewater discharge to a municipal trea&ent plant. The mill then asked the state to shift its 
BOD allocation to that plant. & D M  F~AMEWORK, supra note 61, at 513. 
257. SuTripp & Dudek, supra note 13, at 387. 
258. &DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 513. 
259. SuTripp & Dudek, supra note 13, at 387; Hahn, Doctor's Ordm, supra note 13, at 98. 
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tional regulatory means, with comparable costs, could have 
achieved similar reductions. 
B. Tar-Pamlico River Basin, North Carolina 
A second program which is featured prominently in the litera- 
ture, is a closed, point/nonpoint, nutrient trading program devel- 
oped in 1991 for the Tar-Pamlico River Basin in North ~a ro l ina .~~ '  
The watershed for the river is approximately 5,440 square miles, 
and much of it is used for agricult~re.~~' Although nonpoint 
sources were found to account for 92% of nitrogen loadings into 
the basin,262 the state's initial response focused on further reducing 
discharges by requiring additional pollution controls at a dozen 
point sources, -mostly publicly owned sewage treatment plants- 
at an estimated cost of between $50 and $100 million.z63 However, 
an economic analysis suggested that similar reductions in nutrient 
pollution might be achieved through implementing best manage- 
ment practices for nonpoint sources at an approximate cost of only 
$10 million.= With such potential economic savings, the point 
sources in the basin (twelve POTWs and one industrial discharger) 
formed the Tar-Pamlico Association with the intent of avoiding 
costly point source reductions by inducing nonpoint sources to 
participate in a nutrient reduction plan.265 
The program was designed to be implemented in two phases. 
260. For more derails on the program see Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Pub. No. EPA841-F-93010, TMDL Case Study: Tar- 
Pamlico Basin, NC 2 (1993) (also available on internet at 
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/cs1O/cs1O.htm> (visited Apr. 10, 1998)) [hereinafter 
Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study]; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OmCE, GAO/RCED 95218, 
AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: INFORMATION ON AND CHARAC~XRI!XICS OF S E L E ~ D  
WATERSHED PROJECTS 9, 31-37 (1995) [hereinafter GAO WATWHED REPORT]; Office of 
Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DraJ Trading 
Update-December 96: Tar-Pamlico River, North Carolina (visited Dec. 21, 1997) 
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/uading/am.htm> [hereinafter Tar-Pamlico Up 
do&]. 
The Tar-Pamlico River Basin consists of the Tar River in the upper part of the Basin and 
the Pamlico River in the lower pan of the Basin. Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study, suprq at 2. 
The entire river is over 180 miles long and stretches from the Piedmont to Pamlico Sound. 
Sa Tar-Pamlico Update, supra, 1 2. 
261. The watershed is home to over 246 swine, daily, and p o u l q  operations. Sec 
Tar-Pamlico Updateat 1 2. 
262. Sec Tar-Pamlico Update1 2. 
263. &AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 3-5,36. 
264. Sec id at 36. 
265. SecGAO WATERSHED REPORT, supra note 260, at 33. 
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During the first, from 1991 to 1994, the point sources were to un- 
dertake engineering studies and to implement relatively low cost 
control measures.266 In the second phase, 19952004, additional 
reductions would be required. To commence Phase I the Associa- 
tion, the North Carolina Department of Environmental Manage- 
ment, and two engronniental public interest organizations, the 
Pamlico-Tar River Association, and the Environmental Defense 
Fund, entered into a poirit/nonpoint trading agreement. Under 
the agreement, a nutrient "bubble" was established with a declining 
cap on the total amount of nutrients that the thirteen Association 
members as a whole might discharge.267 Credits for trading are 
earned by the Association when it is able to reduce its nitrogen or 
phosphorus loads below the cap.268 Transactions may occur in two 
different ways. First, the members of the Association may trade 
among themselves to ensure that the Association meets its cap.269 
Second, if the Association cannot meet the overall cap, it may pay a 
fee to the North Carolina Division of Soil and Water Conserva- 
tion's Agricultural Cost-Share 'program, which uses the money to 
implement BMPs designed to reduce agricultural runoff. 
When the second phase was to be implemented there was serious 
disagreement over the goals and the allocation of the reductions, 
most of which were to be taken from nonpoint sources, sparing 
266. Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study, supra note 260, at 5. 
267. The first phase of the trading program set an initial nutrient cap for the Association 
in 1991 at 625,000 kg@, which was reduced to 425,000 kg/yr in 1994. This cap reflected the 
goal of reducing the projected nutrient loads for 1994 by 200,000 kg/yr. This translated 
into a 180,000 kg/yr reduction for nitrogen and a 20,000 kg/yr reduction in phosphorus. 
Scc Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study, supra note 260, at 5. A new cap was set in 1994 for the 
second phase of the trading program in 1994. Scc Tar-Pamluo Update, supra note 260 at 1 3. 
This cap consists of an overall nutrient cap of 475,000 kg/yr, with limits of 405,256 kg/yr for 
nitrogen and 69,744 kg/yr for phosphorus. Scc id As is obvious from the numbers, the nu- 
trient cap for Phase I1 is less stringent than that set for Phase I. 
268. Src Kurt Stephenson, Waldon Kerns, and Len Shabman, Mrginia Tech, Market-Based 
Straugia for Chcsapde Bay P o 4  and Managnncnt: A Literature Synthesis 1 78 (visited March 5, 
1997) <http://199.75.0.27/stac/pubs/litsyn96/steph.htmb [hereinafter Literature Synthesis]. 
One credit allows the ~ssociation to emit one kilogram of nitrogen or phosphorus. Scc 
WATER SCIENCE REPORTER, supra note 57, at 4. The trading ratio between the two pollutants 
is thus 1:l. This is acceptable under EPA's Draft Framework since the impact on the water 
body of the two pollutants is similar. &DRAFT WEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-9--2-10. 
269. &AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 3-6. Members may also bank these credits 
for future use. Scc ~~OWATERSC~ENCE REPORTER, supra note 57, at 4. 
270. The Association does not fund programs directly, but purchases credits for $29 for 
every kilogram of discharge that is above the .cap. Scc WATER SCIENCE REPORTER, supra note 
57, at 4. Credits are good for ten years for structural best management practices, and three 
years for non-suuctural BMPs. Scc d o  Tar-Pamlico Update, supra note 260 at 1 4. 
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point sources further control requirements. The dispute over the 
goals is especially troubling, since modeling indicated that a 45 
percent reduction was called for. Claiming no confidence in the 
model, the state instead set a goal of 30 percent. As a conse- 
quence, the environmental groups refused to participate in the 
program and withdrew their support. Nevertheless, the state im- 
plemented its plan, with environmentalists threatening litigation 
proceedings.271 
Obviously there is some question as to how this program fits 
within the structure of the Clean Water Act, since it appears to con- 
template that violations of the permitted bubble will be addressed 
by payments to the cost-share program. The state has, however, 
indicated that it reserved the right to impose traditional effluent 
limitations and controls if the cap is not maintained, but this seems 
contrary to the trading agreement itself. 2n Most disturbing is the 
fact that point source members of the Association are not held ac- 
countable for the success of BMPs in reducing nutrient loadings.2" 
This raises the possibility that the Association may discharge in ex- 
cess of otherwise permitted point source levels and purchase cred- 
its by making payments to the state, without a matching nonpoint 
reduction. This concern exists because the state did not spend a 
substantial amount of the money which had been contributed to 
the fund by the Association. Of the monies it did spend, some 
were used for projects far up the watershed with no demonstration 
of impact on the area of concern. The Association was also given 
nitrogen reduction credits for the installation of monitoring 
equipment and for operational costs, which of course did not re- 
flect any actual reductions.274 In addition, it lowered the price of 
credits for Phase 11, and subsequently recomputed the number of 
credits which the fund represented based on this lower price, swel- 
ling their number. As a result of this manipulation, the Association 
had a credit of over 22,000 kilograms at the commencement of 
Phase 1 1 . ~ ~ ~  The avenues available through which citizens are per- 
mitted to raise challenges to such state actions is not clear. 
271. Scc GAO WATEWHED REPORT, supra note 260, at 9,35. 
272. See AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 36. Individual nitrogen permits are not i s  
sued for the members of the Association. Id 
273. &AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 36. 
274. Personal communication with Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Environ- 
mental Defense Fund (Apr. 17,1998). 
275. Scc GAO WATERSHED REPORT, supra note 260, at 34. 
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Only two point/nonpoint trades have occurred, and were carried 
out at the beginning of the program as a test.476 More commonly, 
point/point trades have occurred among Association members.277 
Even without nonpoint trades the Association did reduce its nutri- 
ent discharges 28% by the end of the initial phase, in spite of an 
18% increase in its effluent These reductions were achieved 
at modest costs through relatively inexpensive equipment upgrades 
and operational plant improvements,279 which suggests that the 
original cost estimates were seriously inflated and/or that the point 
sources had not made serious attempts to find low cost ways to re- 
duce discharges. Therefore, the Association's protestations that it 
will need to purchase credits to meet its cap when, in the future, 
further reductions are required should be greeted with some skep 
ticism. It should also be noted that in spite of the reductions, water 
quality does not appear to have improved.280 
C. Lake Dillon, Colorado 
A closed, point/nonpoint trading program for phosphorus has 
been in existence since 1984 for Lake u ill on,^' a popular recrea- 
tional area and a reservoir for Denver's drinking water.%' several 
substantial skiing resort communities surround the ~ a k e ; ' ~ ~  their
continuing expansion fueled concerns that increased nutrient 
loadings of phosphorus from rapid population growth in the area 
would cause eutrophication of the ~ a k e . ~ ' ~  Point sources were 
found to account for only 2% of the phosphorus load into the 
~ a k e , ~ ' ~  primarily from local municipal sewage treatment plants; 
the main source of nonpoint source pollution was runoff from 
276. SeckT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 3-6. 
277. Sa Tar-Pamlico Updak, supra note 260 at 1 1. 
278. Sec id 1 5. 
279. SecGAO WATERSHED REPORT, supra note 260, at 37. 
280. Sec id. at 36. 
281. Sec EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Drafl Trading Update- 
December 96: Lake Dillon, Cohaab, 1 1 ((visited March 4, 1997) 
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/~ding/ledi.htm> [hereinafter Lnkc Dillon Up 
date]. The Colorado State Water Quality Control Commission codified the trading program 
as the Dillon Control Regulation in 1984. Sa LaRcDillon Updote, supra note 281, I 3; 5 Colo. 
Code Regs. § 1002.71 (1997). 
282. SaLakeDillon Updale, supra note 280 1 2. 
283. They include Breckenridge, Keystone, Dillon, Frisco, and Copper Mountain. Sec id 
1 2. 
284. &AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 57. 
285. Id. 
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towns and ski areas, along with seepage from failing septic sys- 
tem~."~  
Initially, the State established a TMDL for the Lake for phospho- 
rus and assigned waste load allocations to four POTWS.~'' The trad- 
ing regulation allows the plants to meet their caps by purchasing 
phosphorus reduction credits from the program administrator, the 
Summit County Water Quality Committee. The credits are created 
by nonpoint source reductions achieved from implementing 
BMPS."~ 
To date, only one point /nonpoint trade has occurred, and that 
was executed in an effort to test the program.289 Point sources have 
not been obligated to trade in order to meet their phosphorous 
limits as a result of increased plant eficiencies and slower than ex- 
pected population Indeed, the Lake Dillon point 
sources were able to attain some of the highest phosphorus reduc- 
tion capabilities in the country.291 It appears, therefore, that antici- 
pated point/nonpoint trades are unlikely to occur unless renewed 
population growth puts a strain on present capabilities.292 
As a consequence, the trading program has refocused on non- 
point/nonpoint trading.293 The 1984 trading program and local 
policies now essentially require a "no net increase" for phosphorus 
loads into the lake from nonpoint sources.294 The trading program 
currently allows new nonpoint sources to offset their phosphorus 
286. See Lake Dillon Update, supra note 281, I 2. 
287. It set a total loading of 4610 kg/yr. See id ll 3 See ako WATER SCIENCE REPORTER, su- 
pra note 57, at 4. 
288. See Luke Dillon Update, supra note 281,l  3. The Summit County Water Quality Com- 
mittee coordinates the trading program. The Committee identifies potential BMP projects, 
distributes phosphorus credits, oversees monitoring, and ensures that nonpoint source pol- 
lution reduction ordinances are adopted and implemented. See ako WATER SCIENCE-RE 
PORTER, supra note 57, at 4. The regulation calls for a 2:l trading ratio, whereby a point 
source may receive a credit equal to one kilogram for every two kilograms of nonpoint 
phosphorus removed See Lake Dillun Update, supra note 281,l  3. Additionally, point source 
permits must be modified when point/nonpoint trades occur to include a record of the 
credit amount, specified construction requirements for nonpoint source controls, monitor- 
ing and reporring requirements for nonpoint source BMPs, A d  operation and maintenance 
requirements for BMPs. See id 
289. &AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 37. 
290. &DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 8-1. 
291. Phosphorus loadings were reduced from 3.748 kg/yr in 1981 to 529 kg/yr in 1991. 
See Luke Dillon Updutc, supra note 281, f 5. 
292. .%AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 3-7. 
293. See LukeDillon Ll@!.uk, supra note 281,l 1. 
294. See Literature Synthesis, supra note 268, f 74. 
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loads by implementing BMPs at existing nonpoint sources.295 
There have been three nonpoint/nonpoint "trades" to date.296 
D. Cherry Creek Basin, Colorado 
Cherry Creek Reservoir is a major recreational spot southeast of 
298 
~ e n v e r . ~ '  In 1984, the Cherry Creek Basin Authority, in an ef- 
fort to protect the water quality in the reservoir, calculated a 
TMDL for phosphorus and allocated the loadings to twelve sewage 
treatment plants. In 1985, the Cherry Creek Control Regulation 
was established which allowed point sources to receive credits for 
the reduction of nonpoint source loadings of phosphorus achieved 
by implementing BMPs. First, however, urban nonpoint sources 
had to make a 50 percent reduction from 1990 base year before 
trades could take place. However, no guidelines for trading were 
developed, and no trades occurred, most likely because the popula- 
tion did not increase as anticipated.299 
In an effort to revitalize the program, the Authority drafted 
guidelines for a point/nonpoint trading program for phosphorus, 
and submitted a copy to the Colorado State Water Quality Control 
Commission in April, 1997, for The Authority gener- 
295. Set Lake D i h  Update, supra note 281,15. 
296. First, the Frisco Sanitation Disuict used storm water controls to achieve additional 
phosphorus load reductions. The Town of Frisco plans to bank those 'credits" to use for 
loads that a new golf course is expected to generate. Second, Keystone ski resort paid to 
connect individual septic systems to sewer lines to reduce phosphorus loads, essentially 
banking credits to apply to projected nonpoint source loading from future resort develop 
ment. S w D m  FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 81. Third, the Town of Breckenridge banked 
a 25 kg/yr credit when it sewered one subdivision that had a 50 kg/yr load. Scc Lake D i h  
Update, supra note 281,15. 
297. Scc EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Draft Trading Update: December 
96: Chmy Cseek Basin, Colorado, 1 2 (visited March 4, 1997) <http://ww.epa.gov/ 
owow/watershed/trading/cheny.htm> [hereinafter Chmy Cruk Update]. 
298. Scc id 1 2. The Cherry Creek Basin Authority is in charge of water quality manage- 
ment in the Basin, and is comprised of representatives from counties, cities,-towns waste;- 
ter districts and ex-officio members that ripresent State, Federal and regional organizations 
who have a hand in protecting the Basin's watershed. Id 1 3. 
299. See Chmy Crcck Update, supra note 297, q 1; Summoq of Other State Programs, supra note 
249,15. 
300. Personal communication with Ronda L. Sandquist (March 24, 1997). Scc generally 
CHERRY CREEK BASIN AUTHORITY, DRUT OF CHERRY CREEK BASIN WATER QUAL~NAUTHOIUIY 
EFFLUENT TRADING GUIDELINES (1997) [hereinafter CHERRY CREEK GUIDELINES]. The pur- 
pose of the program is described as follows: T h e  Trading Program allows point source dis- 
chargers to receive phosphorus pounds for new or increased phosphorus wasteload alloca- 
tions in exchange for reductions of phosphorus loading from nonpoint sources." Id at 1 
Under the new uading guidelines, &o types of trades-are allowed: (1) Authority project 
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ates credits by implementing BMPs and placing those credits in a 
"trading pool."g0' These trading pool credits may then be pur- 
chased by individual dischargers.302 To date, the Cherry Creek Ba- 
sin Authority has generated credits for the trading pool by imple- 
menting four nonpoint source control projects, with plans to 
initiate others.90s 
E. Analysis 
Two dominant themes appear when analyzing the above exam- 
ples. First, few real trades occurred in any of the programs. In all 
of them trading was rendered unnecessary, at least for the time be- 
ing, because facilities reduced discharges to or below required lev- 
els through facility changes or improved operation and mainte- 
nance. Trading may have provided an incentive for dischargers to 
improve their pollution reduction controls and reduce their dis- 
charges below their cap, either to avoid purchasing credits, or with 
an expectation of selling them.%' On the other hand, the existence 
trades, and (2) private project trades (In-Kind Trades). See id, at 1. 
301. See Chmy Creek Up&&, supra note 297,14. 
302. See id If there are credits in the Trade Pool, a point source may purchase phospho- 
rus credits only if: (1) there is a need for credits, (2) the treatment facility operates as effi- 
ciently as possible now and in the future with current technology to achieve expected phoc 
phorus reductions, (3) present and future compliance with all existing effluent limitations 
will be met, and (4) that the treatment facility and trade is consistent with the CCB Water 
Quality Management Master Plan and the Cherry Creek Control Reservoir Regulation. Sec 
CHERRY CREEK GUIDELINES, supra note 300, at 67. Under the second category, privately con- 
structed BMPs to control nonpoint source pollution will be reviewed by the Authority to de- 
termine how many 'in-kind" credits such projects are worth. The Authority will then assign 
those credits to the private party. A private party may apply its credits to its own point source 
discharges, or trade-them with other point sources up&the Authority's approval. Sec id 
303. See Chmy Creek Update, supra note 297,1 4. The EPA has also cited Boulder Creek, 
CO, where the City made ecological modifications to Boulder Creek which improved water 
quality, in lieu of requiring pollutant load reductions, as an example of a point/nonpoint 
trading program, with a twist. See EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Drafl 
Tradin~ Update-LIecmnber 96: B a r b  CT& Coluradn (visited Mar. 4, 1997) 
<http://w&v.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/bould.h [hereinafter Boulder Creek U p  
&I&].  Sec also DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at Appendix C. However, this program 
does not fit the basic criteria of a trading program: there are no established trading guide- 
lines, there are no credits to be purchased or sold, and there are no real trading partners. 
Boulder Creek can really be viewed as a common sense approach alternative to trading. The 
City voluntarily used money to control nonpoint source pollution instead of implementing 
expensive plant upgrades. Obviously such an approach should be considered before a trad- 
ing program is developed. Although the program is not a trading program, but simply a 
habitat restoration effort, it suggests other options which might be of some value on Long 
Island Sound. 
304. &WATER SCIENCE REPORTER, supra note 57, at 5. 
Heinonline - -  23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 9 4  1 9 9 8  
19981 Reducing Nitrogen Pollution 
of the cap itself may be the real market driver. 
Second, despite the lack of trading, pollution reduction goals, if 
not water quality goals, were attained.g05 Fox River achieved de- 
sired BOD levels; Tar-Pamlico achieved desired nutrient load re- 
ductions; and Lake Dillon achieved desired phosphorus load re- 
d u c t i o n ~ . ~  Although proponents of trading argue that the 
programs were successful examples of trading programs, we must 
ask whether a major factor was the existence of caps on pollution 
discharges, and not necessarily the availability of trading. In fact it 
appears in the Tarr-Pamlico case that the less stringent require- 
ments in the second phase of the program effectively reduced any 
incentive to trade. Additionally, critics might suggest that the same 
reductions could likely have been achieved through more tradi- 
tional regulatory means. 
In the final analysis, when these programs are evaluated strictly 
in terms of progress toward achieving pollution reduction andwa- 
ter quality goals, they can arguably be considered successful. How- 
ever, in the programs, trading did not produce the desired load 
reductions. Instead, the reductions were accomplished by in- 
creases in plant operating efficiencies without regard to trades. It 
has been asserted that these programs are simply not ripe, and that 
trading will occur once low-cost options are unable to keep pace 
with rising pollutant 10ads.~' Nevertheless, without a sufficient 
market driver, such as a lower cap, trading is not likely to occur 
within these programs in the near future. This is an important 
point to keep in mind when examining the Long Island Sound 
305. For example, Fox River, Tar-Pamlico, and Lake Dillon have all had few trades that 
were actually contemplated by their respective programs. Fox River has had two realloca- 
tions of BOD and no actual point/point trades; Tar-Pamlico has had only two 
point/nonpoint trades to test the system and a few point/point trades among members of 
the Association; and Lake Dillon has had only one point/nonpoint trade to test the system 
and three nonpoint/nonpoint trades not initially contemplated by the program. 
306. Cherry Creek is not included in the above analysis because it has only recently been 
developed. However, Cherry Creek does offer the opportunity to predict how a new pro- 
gram will progress. The Cherry Creek program is similar to the point/nonpoint trading 
program at Lake Dillon and at Tar-Pamlico. It is likely that the same fate will befall Cherry 
Creek as the other programs. Trading will most likely provide incentives to point source 
dischargers to become more efficient, thus relieving the need for any trades. If 'no net in- 
crease" policies are implemented as with Lake Dillon, the program will likely become a 
nonpoint/nonpoint trading program. 
307. S~XWATER SCIENCE REPORTER, supra note 57, at 4. "Rather than an indication of pol- 
icy failure, the lack of immediate trades demonstrates how a trading system creates pollution 
prevention incentives. Once low-cost pollution prevention options are exhausted, trades will 
become more frequent." Id. 
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proposals. 
The Long Island Sound Ad Hoc Nitrogen Trading Discussion 
Group has been reviewing the feasibility of developing a nitrogen 
trading program to facilitate progress toward the ultimate nitrogen 
reduction goal. A "strawman" proposal was prepared which evalu- 
ated the various trading possibilities in light of the EPA's DraP 
Framacrork for Waterskd-Based ~ r a d i n g . ~  A point-point capand- 
trade trading program was suggested to include publicly owned 
treatment works and the handful of industrial dischargers of high 
levels of nitrogen, with an option to integrate a point/nonpoint 
program in the f u t ~ r e . ~  The program would cover the entire 
Long Island Sound Study area. The Clean Water Act would pro- 
vide the basis for credit allocations, issued for a specific period of 
time, and trades would be reflected in NPDES permits. Under this 
original proposal, trades could be made at anytime, with an annual 
accounting; dischargers that exceeded their discharge limits for ni- 
trogen would be required to purchase the additional credits neces- 
sary for compliance. A credit bank was suggested,.operated by the 
states, to supply credits when the market could not meet the de- 
mand, and to oversee implementation of the Utilizing 
this proposal as a starting point, various permutations have been 
and continue to be examined by the committee in light of the par- 
ticular geographic, legal, economic and political situation in the 
Long Island Sound region. Because of the extent to which these 
proposals are in flux, we examine only the major components of 
the proposals. 
A. Geographic Considerations 
Long Island Sound differs from many other estuaries in that it 
has no major source of freshwater at its head, and it is open at both 
ends. It receives salt-water flow from the ocean at its eastern end, 
and less saline waters from the Upper Bay of New York Harbor 
through the East River and Harlem River tidal straits.'" The un- 
308. Sec AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 419 to 423. 
309. If a point source tmding program was established, it might lead to additional atten- 
tion to the lack of control of nonpoint sources, and perhaps increase pressure for change. 
310. Sec AT. KEARNY, INC., supra note 33, at 4-20 to 422. 
311. Both of these sources deliver nitrogen to the Sound from outside its geographic 
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synchronized tides of the these rivers and the Atlantic, as well as 
the differential in spatial openings, contribute to a complex flow 
and circulation pattern which varies with the season and meteoro- 
logical  condition^.^'^ During the summer months stratification oc- 
curs when warmer fresher water on the surface of the Sound lies on 
top of cooler saltier water. The density difference, called a pycno- 
cline, prevents the two layers from mixing which would infuse oxy- 
gen into the lower strata. This leads to hypoxic conditions and 
their attendant ecological damage.313 
As noted earlier, the areas of greatest oxygen deprivation gener- 
ally occur in the western end of the Sound, near New York City. 
Nitrogen from sources in that region therefore has a direct impact 
on the area of greatest ecological concern. The impact of nitrogen 
from sources farther removed from this area is attenuated. Thus a 
given amount of nitrogen discharged in eastern locales contributes 
much less to hypoxic conditions levels than does a nitrogen dis- 
charge of equal magnitude in western regions. 
Nitrogen is a regional pollutant; nitrogen discharged anywhere 
in the watershed will have some impact on the western Sound. It 
may also have a substantial local impact at the point of discharge. 314 
This is an important consideration when designing a pollutant 
trading program, since pollutants which have a strong local impact 
may not be prime candidates for a large scale trading program.315 
Trading functions more effectively when the effects of the pollut- 
ants are regional in nature, and the location of the source of the 
emissions is not a major factor. A good example of this is the sul- 
fur dioxide trading program under the Clean Air Act, where di- 
verse sources, mostly located in the Midwestern United States, con- 
tribute at essentially the same impact level to air quality problems 
boundaries. This 'boundw conuibution" is roughly twenty percent of the human-related 
nitrogen load. CCMP, supra note 2, at 2&21. 
312. CCMP, supra note 2, at 1. 
313. SecCCMP SUMMARY, supra note 27, at 12; supra note 24. 
314. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 55, at 
423. 
315. Id at 410. 
Emissions trading seems to work especially well for uniformly mixed pollutants [those 
for which the location of emission is not an important policy concern]. No diffusion 
modeling is necessary to establish effects on ambient concentrations and regulators do 
not have to worry about trades creating "hot spots" or localized areas of high pollution 
concentration. Trades can be on a one-to- one basis. 
Id 
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in the ~ a s t . ~ ' ~  The Long Island Sound situation differs, however, 
from the sulfur dioxide trading program, because although the 
pollutant may be regional in nature, source location is nevertheless 
an important factor. Due to the varying impacts of the treatment 
plants along the Sound, trades cannot readily be made on a one-te 
one basis, and the employment of some type of zone system with 
trading ratios may be necessary if the trading system is to achieve 
317 
success. Accordingly, the original "strawman" proposal recom- 
mended that the Sound be segmented into the eleven geographic 
management zones which had previously been designated by the 
Long Island Sound Study. It was also suggested that @e ratios de- 
veloped by the Long Island Sound Study reflect the actual impact 
of each zone's discharges on critical 'dissolved oxygen levels in the 
Sound an be utilized as trading ratios, or "normalized" exchange 
rates.318 
~urthermore, trading can fit well into the holistic geographic a p  
proach called for in a watershed &ategy, since the goal of the 
strategy is to improve the overall health of the waterbody. 
B. The Market 
In addition to the legal issues that must be addressed when any 
trading program is established, the economics of the potential 
market must be -examined. Two factors in particular require atten- 
tion. The first is the pollution control costs of the potential trading 
partners. A rational basis for trading exists only if there is a sub- 
stantial difference among dischargers in the costs of controlling a 
given amount ~Fpollution. The second factor is the difference in 
environmental impact of equivalent loadings from each source. 
The ecological benefit of reducing a single unit of pollution from 
one source can be compared to reducing a unit of pollution from a 
different source and expressed as a ratio.319 Where trading occurs 
316. The same conclusion may also apply to nitrogen oxides (in terms of regional haze, 
smog and fine particle pollution) and to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 
317. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, su- 
pm note 55, at 411. Although zoned systems may require additional management and trans- 
action costs, the effort to take location into account may be worth it both in terms of cost 
efficiency and environmental response. See id. at 492-94. 
318. Local impacts of niuogen discharges would have to be evaluated, and trades which 
would impair those waters would be prohibited, even if they were within the overall program 
limits for the Sound. Extensive monitoring and analysis would likely be required to ensure 
that local waters were protected. 
319. Sec DRAFT FRAMEWORK, mpa note 61 , at 35. 
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between sources in areas with differing influence on the protected 
water body, these ratios can compensate for the geographical loca- 
tion of parties.sm Because of the geographic conditions previously 
described, for a Long Island trading program to be an environ- 
mental success the use of trading ratios would likely be necessary. 
1. Costs of Plant Improvements 
Overall costs estimates for upgrading sewage treatment plants 
have varied substantially. The Long Island Sound Study originally 
estimated costs for nitrogen removal to exceed $8 billion, al- 
though a substantially lower figure is likely.3P' More significant 
than overall costs are the individual costs to upgrade each plant, 
since it is the differential in costs among plants that encourages 
trading and leads to market efficiencies. Other factors being equal, 
plants having high pollution reduction costs will find it economi- 
cally advantageous to purchase credits from plants having lower 
control costs. 
Plant-by-plant estimates of upgrade costs, prepared by Connecti- 
cut and New York based on guidance developed by the Long Island 
Sound Office, demonstrate the incremental cost effectiveness of 
the various upgrades. By comparing the estimated cost of an indi- 
vidual plant upgrade with the incremental reduction in nitrogen 
discharge expected from that expenditure, the amount of nitrogen 
removed for each million dollars spent can be calculated for each 
of the plants. Those figures ranged from 809 lbs/$l million, down 
to less than one pound/$l million.325 Additional calculations were 
carried out combining these costs with the impact ratios described 
above. Recognizing the inherent weaknesses in cost estimates, the 
resultant figures nonetheless give an approximate idea of the com- 
parative ecological improvement which could be expected in the 
most severely stressed portions of the Sound as a result of spending 
$1 million in nitrogen reduction at each plant. The impacts 
ranged from 1.9 to 0.0008 for each million dollars spent.323 This 
variation in impact is not surprising, since the areas with the lowest 
320. ScckT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 2-17 to 2-18.. 
321. Sac supra note 33. 
322. Scc Memorandum from Mark Tedesco, Technical Director, Long Island Sound Of- 
fice, to Nitrogen Trading Discussion Group, December 13, 1996, Table 1. The cost data was 
provided by the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection and the New York 
State Department of Environmental Consenation. Id., Table 2. 
323. Id., Table 2. 
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dissolved oxygen readings are in the western half of the soundsP4 
and, as we have seen, nitrogen loadings in eastern locales contrib- 
ute much less to hypoxic conditions than do nitrogen loadings of 
equal magnitude in western regions. 
2. Trading Ratios 
As noted, the Long Island Sound Study has already divided the 
watershed into 11 management zones and measured their com- 
parative effects on the Ratios have been established to 
indicate roughly the comparative effect on hypoxia of nitrogen dis- 
charge in different areas of the Sound; the zone with the greatest 
influence on the areas of lowest dissolved oxygensP6 is given a value, 
or normalized exchange rate, of one. Zones with lower impact 
have lower values. The following chart shows the zones and the 
values. A Long Island Sound trading program could use the values 
calculated for the management zone exchange rates as a basis for 
the trade ratios in a Sound-wide trading market. 
Using these exchange rates, Table 1 was created showing the 
relative value of each zone's "credit," or unit of pollution reduc- 
tion, in each of the other zones. If a credit equals one pound of 
nitrogen removed, we see that a single credit from zone 10, which 
is located at the western end of the Sound and has the highest im- 
pact on the areas of low oxygen, is worth almost six credits from 
zone 1, at the eastern end. The table has been provided to demon- 
strate the relationships among the various  source^.^" 
Recognizing the theoretical setting in which this exercise is being 
carried out, and the limitations of the data, we can nonetheless 
usefully engage in an analysis of the potential for trading in a Long 
Island Sound market. 
324. See CCMP, supra note 2, at 11. 
325. Scc AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 4-16. The ratios were calculated based on 
data produced by the LIS 3.0 model. In addition to the management zones, the Sound itself 
was divided into 'response" zones, which correspond to the levels of dissolved oxygen in the 
water column. 
326. Zone 10. 
327. This exchange rate chart was calculated for the author using the normalized ex- 
change rates. For the source of each zone's rates, SWAT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 4- 
16. By and large areas located closer to the areas of low oxygen will have a greater impact 
than those located at a distance. Zones 8 and 9 are somewhat of anomaly, since they lie at 
the junction of the Sound and the East River and are affected by circulation patterns there. 
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3. Buyers and Sellers 
Management Zone 10, which is located at the environmentally 
stressed western end of the Sound, is a logical place to start an ex- 
amination of interzone trading. It has the most direct impact on 
areas of low dissolved oxygen, and its normalized exchange rate is 
1.000. Considering only the ecological impact, and assuming simi- 
lar costs of pollution control among the prospective trading part- 
ners, this favorable exchange rate should result in Zone 10 sources 
becoming suppliers of credits. A source in Zone 10 would have 
high incentive to produce and sell credits, as each credit would be 
worth at least 1.068 credits in any other zone. A single Zone 10 
credit would be worth as many as 5 credits in Zone 1, located at the 
eastern end of the Sound, suggesting that even Zone 10 plants with 
high incremental costs could produce credits competitively. If this 
is the case, then economic self interest should lead to a reduction 
in discharges of nitrogen by Zone 10 sources as they attempt to 
produce and export as many credits as economically feasible. A 
load reduction in Zone 10 could directly enhance the water quality 
of the traditionally oxygen depleted western Sound. 
On the flip side, Zone 1 plants could be major credit consumers 
because these sources would have much less incentive to make in- 
cremental expenditures to produce credits. For instance, a Zone 1 
source wishing to produce excess credits to sell in neighboring 
Zone 2 would have to produce roughly 1.2 pounds of nitrogen re- 
duction for each pound that Zone 2 needed, because one pound of 
pollution in Zone 2 has about 1.2 times the effect on ambient DO 
levels than a pound discharged in Zone 1. A price adjustment to 
reflect the value of the purchased credit could make it difficult for 
the Zone 1 source to recoup its investment or turn a profit. 
Nevertheless, an economically efficient source within a zone with 
a poor trading ratio might choose to proceed with capital expendi- 
tures in the expectation of trading with less efficient sources within 
the same zone. Moreover, the weak exchange rate could foster 
trading in general by bolstering the demand for credits from other 
zones. Zone 1 sources should, prefer to achieve compliance by 
purchasing "foreign" credits worth five or six times as much in 
terms of pollution reduction as their "domestic credits." This 
would effectively foster pollution reduction in the zones with the 
highest trading ratios, which are also the zones with the greatest 
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ecological impact. This transfer of pollution reduction activities to 
the most sensitive areas from less threatened ones should be bene- 
ficial to the Sound. 
Recognizing that both control costs and trading ratios may have 
a substantial impact on the market, we must consider how the two 
may affect market decisions in order to determine whether there is 
likely to be a sufficient supply of credits for trading to occur. 
4. Forecasting Supply and Demand 328 
The probable suppliers and purchasers in a Long Island Sound 
trading program can be forecast by examining three factors: the 
market size of the zones in question; the number of facilities within 
those zones and their incremental cost projections; and the p r e  
jected volume of nitrogen removal. An analysis of these factors will 
help determine the potential number of credits available. How- 
ever, the actual geographic extent of the market is somewhat un- 
certain. There appears to be some skepticism among water pollu- 
tion officials, especially in New York, regarding the need and the 
practicality of a trading program. Some New York officials appear 
to believe that the situation confronting major nitrogen discharg- 
ers is being sufiiciently addressed through current efforts, and that 
a trading program would not enhance reductions. 
The major sewage treatment plants which fiect  the Sound are 
located either in New York City, or in Westchester County, New 
York, which lies immediately north of the city, or on the western 
portion of Long Island. Many of the Manhattan plants are cur- 
rently slated for upgrades, and the state is providing substantial 
funding. A number of these upgrades are required by court order, 
and it is unlikely that any of the parties to the litigation would be 
interested in attempting to modify the orders so as to.allow a trad- 
ing program. The four plants in Westchester County already oper- 
ate under a bubble permit, as do some of the Long Island plants.329 
328. The source of all cost and New York volume data is a spreadsheet report entitled 
"Point Source Actions," which was distributed to members of the Nitrogen Trading Group. 
Connecticut volume data is taken from a spreadsheet dated January 12, 1998, also distrib 
uted to members. Both are on file with the author. 
329. Sec New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, SPDES Permits Nos. 
0026697 (New Rochelle), 0026701 (Mamaronek), 0026786 (Pon Chester), and 0026719 
(Blind Brook) all in Westchester County, and Nos. 0026999 (Great Neck), 0022128 (V~llage 
o f  Great Neck), 0021342 (Huntington), 0026841 (Belgrave), 0026620 (Glen Cove), 0026778 
(Port Washington), 0021822 (Oyster Bay), and 002331 1 (Kings Park). 
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Consequently, there appears to be little enthusiasm at the present 
time on the part of most New York officials for engaging in the 
substantial administrative work which a trading program entails, 
and which they regard as providing little benefit.s90 This may well 
change as the details of the program become more defined, espe- 
cially if plant operators perceive that potential benefits could be 
derived through trading. 
It is possible that trading might be initiated in Connecticut in- 
stead of New York, as Connecticut officials have voiced more s u p  
port for trading. Accordingly, two trading scenarios are provided 
below, one reflecting a Sound-wide trading program using the in- 
terzone trading ratios, the other a Connecticut only program. 
a. Interzone Trading 
An interzone trading arrangement would allow trades among fa- 
cilities in all eleven zones designated by the Long Island Sound 
Study, employing the calculated trading ratios. A key factor will be 
whether the zones with favorable rates actually produce a substan- 
tial number of credits for the market. A review of the data discloses 
three zones (Zones 6, 11, and 10) that have very strong exchange 
rates with trade ratios of .927 or better. This suggests that sources 
in these zones would have a strong economic incentive to produce 
nitrogen credits, assuming an appropriate demand. Furthermore, 
many of the plants can achieve nitrogen removal rates of at least 
100 pounds a day for each million dollars expended in capital u p  
grades above the 58.5 percent removal goal."' Three of these 
POTWs have cost efficiency ratings of over 330 pounds per day per 
million dollars spent; Greenwich, located in Zone 6, may be able to 
reduce nitrogen more cost effectively than any other plant. That 
facility has a cost efficiency rating of over 800 pounds per day per 
million dollars spent on capital costs. These levels of cost efficiency 
330. Personal communications with Mark Tedesco, Technical Director, Long Island 
Sound O&ce (April 22, 1998), and Phillip M. DeGaetano, Director, Bureau of Watershed 
Management, ~ h s i o n  of Water, New ~ o i k  State Department of Environmental Conse- 
tion (April 21,1998). See gmra4, LISS SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL 
FOR PHASE 111 ACTIONS FOR HWOXIA MANAGEMENT (Dec. 1997). 
331. The 178 facilities that contribute effluent to the Sound have been ranked in terms of 
projected cost efficiency. The agency looked at the incremental amount of nitrogen removal 
over the incremental capital c&t of removing nitrogen in excess of 58.5 percent. Sce supra 
note 322. 
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are encouraging because they indicate that these plants should be 
able to produce credits at relatively reasonable prices. 
A final factor to consider is the projected volume of nitrogen 
removal. . Even if a plant is located in a zone with a strong ex- 
change rate and has a high efficiency rating, it may not generite 
many credits if it is a small volume facility. Some facilities have pro- 
jected nitrogen reducdon volumes of 20,000 to 30,000 pounds a 
day, which could translate into as' many credits for the market. 
Conversely, small POTWs may remove less than 5 pounds a'day. 
Capital investment in these facilities might prove to be cost effec- 
tive, but do little to sustain the supply of credits to the market. In 
the three zones with the strongest ratios, only Stamford is projected 
to remove in excess of 1000 pounds per day.. Therefore, these .fa- 
cilities alone may not be able, to supply a substantial number of 
credits for the program. However, a sizable number of facilities 
could participate in the program; the right combination of supply 
and demand need not rest on the production of plants in zones 6, 
10 and 11. This is in sharp distinction from some of the trading 
programs already considered, which were comprised of a small 
number of facilities.332 
332. One other potential trading arrangement might be trading only within each zone. 
Such intrazone trading between facilities within the same management zone would be done 
at a 1:l exchange rate, creating a straightforward market siktion.  If supply and demand 
are adequate, then uading within the confines of a single zone might take place, whether 
interzone trading is successful or even allowed. But as suggested by the Tar-Pamlico experi- 
ence, the market is not assured. Again we must look at whether each zone has facilities 
which can supply credits, and whether there is a sufficient cost differential to create ade- 
quate demand for those credits. The answer is not obvious in all the cases. 
Zone 1 appears to have the most positive prospects for sustaining intrazone trading. It 
contains twenty plants with MIying abilities to implement nitrogen removal technologies in 
a cost-effective manner, and sufficient volume to support trading. While some plants will be 
able to cost-effectively implement nitrogen removal (Stonington-Mystic, Groton Town and 
Groton Village), others will have substantial difficulty doing so (UCONN, Ledyard, and 
Griswold). Each source could remove between 23 and 970 lbs of nitrogen a day, not an ex- 
cessive spread. This suggests a reasonable likelihood that neither demand nor supply will 
outsuip the other. The fact that the most cost-effective suppliers in the zone are also the top 
producers is ideal, since they should be capable of creating enough credits to satisfy de- 
mand. Yet, these suppliers are not so large that they are likely to flood the credit market 
consequently making credit production unprofitable. 
By contrast, a viable market within Zone 9 could be problematical. It has only 2 point 
sources, but one of its most efficient producers (Newton Creek) is quite large. Its supply of 
credits would far exceed the demand of the small intrazone market. Even if interzone trad- 
ing were available, Zone 9's poor exchange rate (.log) would not make its credits particu- 
larly attractive, unless they were priced extremely low. 
Zone 10 is unique in that each one of its sources has the potential to be a cost-effective 
credit supplier. Without interzone trading, this market could mirror Tar-Pamlico: plenty of 
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b. Connecticut-Only Trading 
Exchange ratios. Because of a perceived reluctance by New York 
officials to participate in a trading program, there has been some 
discussion among Long Island Sound officials concerning the pos- 
sibility of establishing a trading program that would include only 
Connecticut sources. To determine whether such a program is vi- 
able the exchange ratios must be reset and evaluated, and produc- 
tion and credit demand within the management zones in Con- 
necticut should be examined. 
Since the exchange ratios were normalized to Zone 10, a zone 
located in New York, they must be recalculated to fit a Connecticut- 
only arrangement. Due to its influence on the Sound, Zone 6 be- 
comes the marker against which the ratios for the other zones will 
be calculated. 
Seller's Region: The number at the nexus of Seller's and Purchaser's 
zones equals the value of Seller's credit in Purchaser's zone. 
Purchaser's Region: The figure indicates how many credits Purchaser 
will have to buy from Seller to gain one credit in Purchaser's zone. 
TABLE 2 
Exchange Rate Charts for CT-Only Pollutant Trading 
Seller's Region 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
suppliers, no buyers. Given the zone's strong exchange rate, the environmental plus that 
credit exportation represents here, as well as a poor intrazone demand, interzone trading 
scheme is far more appropriate for ZonelO. 
The remaining zones have dynamics which appear to suggest that intrazone aading could 
be maintained. They are not "top-heavy" like Zone 10, nor as "small" as Zone 9. What 
would be lost in an intrazone trading program, however, is the benefit derived from the ex- 
portation of credits from zones near "hot spots" to areas with less impaired waters. This con- 
sideration militates in favor of interzone trading. 
1 (0.182) 
2 (0.218) 
Purchaser's 3 (0.596) 
Region 4 (0.671) 
5 (0.854) 
6 (1.000) 
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(0.182) (0.218) (0.596) (0.671) (0.854) (1.000) 
1.000 0.835 0.305 0.271 0.213 0.182 
1.198 1.000 0.366 0.325 0.255 0.218 
3.274 2.733 1.000 0.888 0.698 0.595 
3.687 3.078 1.126 1.000 0.786 0.671 
4.692 3.917 1.433 1.273. 1.000 0.854 
5.494 4.587 1.678 1.490 1.171 1.000 
Looking only at trading ratios we see that Zones 5 and 6, with ra- 
tios of .854 and 1.000 respectively, have the greatest incentive to 
produce credits for the market, while Zones 1 and 2, with low trad- 
ing ratios have the strongest incentive to purchase credits. The 
likely market role of Zones 3 and 4 is less clear. 
Supply. It should be noted that the daily level of nitrogen removal 
is much lower at plants in Connecticut than in New York. Only 
eight Connecticut sewage treatment plants could be expected to 
remove more than 1000 pounds per day, and none over 5000 
333 pounds. This indicates that, barring unexpectedly large reduc- 
tions at other plants, no single sewage treatment plant in Connecti- 
cut will dominate the market on either the supply side or the de- 
mand side. Zone 6, for example, is benefited by the most favorable 
ratio (1.000). It also boasts the most cost effective point source. 334 
Yet it does not contain any facilities which remove more than 1400 
pounds a day. This means that Zone 6 could not be the sole source 
of credits generated for trading, and could not by itself satisfy a 
reasonably active market. Similarly, Zone 5 has an exchange ratio 
conducive to credit production, but other factors would prevent it 
from becoming a dominate market figure. While the zone can po- 
tentially supply more credits than Zone 6, it still can only poten- 
tially remove 3,500 pounds per day as a zone. Also, none of the fa- 
cilities in Zone 5 are projected to reduce nitrogen at an 
economically efficient level. 
Demand. The lack of dominant suppliers could doom a trading 
scheme in which demand was high. Plants which were unable to 
attain the credits they desired would find it necessary to invest in 
capital improvements, even when that investment was not eco- 
nomically efficient. However, in a Connecticut-only trading 
scheme, it does not appear that the demand will exceed supply to 
any substantial degree. Due to the small size of the facilities, the 
potential demand from Zones 1 and 2, where low exchange ratios 
exist, will presumably be net purchasers rather than sellers, is not 
likely to be substantial.335 An exception is Hartford, which is a high 
volume facility, but which is projected to be relatively cost efficient, 
333. In conuast, the four plants in Zone 8 could each remove more than 5000 pounds of 
nitrogen a day. 
334. Greenwich. 
335. Zone 1 has 20 facilities, none of which is larger than 1000 pounds a day. Its larger 
facilities may be able to reduce nitrogen in a cost effective fashion. It does not appear, then, 
that Zone 1 will contribute to a demand that exceeds the credit supply. 
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increasing the likelihood that they will produce rather than con- 
sume 
As for Zones 3 and 4, their exchange ratios are not strong 
enough to provide incentive to export credits to Zones 5 and 6, but 
they do provide incentive to export credits to Zones 1 and 2. Addi- 
tionally, facilities here may seek to import credits from Zone 5 and 
6. The volume and cost effectiveness data supports the prediction 
that Zone 3 and 4 will both simultaneously supply and demand 
credits.=' The facility in Zone 3 which merits special attention is 
the Norwalk plant which removes a state-high 2400 pounds of ni- 
trogen daily. In terms of cost efficiency, this plant ranks in the 
middle, thus a decision to undertake substantial capital upgrades 
could make it a major producer of removal credits. Overall, the di- 
rection in which the Norwalk and Hartford plants choose to pro- 
ceed could significantly shape a Connecticut trading market. 
In spite of the uncertainties, it does appear that a Connecticut 
only trading program would operate effectively. The exchange ra- 
tios are not substantially different than those which exist in a bi- 
state program, and the variation is sufficient to provide incentives 
to export and import throughout the zones. Admittedly, the 
amount of nitrogen removed by Connecticut plants, both individu- 
ally and overall is significantly less than in New York. However, this 
should mean that a Connecticut-only program will lack major 
power players that dominate either side of the market. This may 
result in less trading with regards to the number of credits trans- 
ferred, but indicates that more facilities would participate in trad- 
ing. Most importantly, there is no indication that either supply or 
demand will exceed the other to a degree which frustrates the 
market. The supply and demand seem to be close enough for ac- 
tive trading to take place, and overall the outlook seems positive.338 
336. Hartford discharges over 5000 pounds of nitrogen a day, making it the largest facility 
in Connecticut. The fact that it is projected to be cost effective if upgraded may encourage 
the City to make those capital expenses necessary to met the reduction target of 58.5%, and 
become a major source of credits. 
As in Zone 1, the larger Zone 2 facilities are clustered near the top of the rankings for p e  
tential cost effectiveness. Therefore, it is unlikely that Zone 2 will demand more credits than 
can be supplied. 
337. For example, many of Zone 4's facilities have extremely low cost efficiency ratings. 
Many also have very small volumes: 9 have nitrogen removal rates of 10 lbs./day or less. It 
would be logical for these plants to buy credits because they are not cost effective and do not 
have the capacity to produce many credits for export. But, these facilities are small enough 
so that they alone will not drain the supply of credits. 
338. It is important to keep in mind that prevailing market conditions will change with 
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5. Additional Market Considerations 
Two problems which must be recognized in all of these discus- 
sions are the weaknesses in the available data concerning costs, and 
the potential impact of government funding. Cost estimates, in 
their initial stages, have varied widely, and officials have pointed 
out the degree to which the figures must be refined when more 
precise plans for each plant are drawn.339 
The impact which government funding of plant upgrades has on 
a market based trading program also requires additional evalua- 
tion. Traditionally, federal and state governments have underwrit- 
ten substantial portions of local upgrades, either through direct 
grants or through revolving loan programs.u0 Both New York and 
Connecticut employ grant and loan programs which are prioritized 
to target the most urgently needed projects f i r ~ t . ~ '  To the extent 
that a plant benefits from a state grant or loan, is there a distortion 
of the market? The answer is not clear, especially when we con- 
sider that all of the funds we are discussing are public monies, 
whether they come from the federal, state or local government. 
Grants and loans obviously favor the localities which receive them. 
This "inequity" would occur whether there was a trading program 
or not. All grants and loans could be suspended in order to keep a 
each step taken toward achieving the 58.5% reduction target. After Phase I11 begins, s u b  
stantial reductions in nitrogen discharges will be required every five years for the next ten 
years. Potential sellers will have fewer credits to sell as their discharge limits become more 
&ingent, credit demand could be expected to rise, and credit prices might increase signifi- 
cantly. Adjusting to the ensuing market conditions will be inother challenge for administra- 
tors and market participants to overcome. 
339. S c c P t w ~  I11 PROPOSAL, supranote 21, at 11. Scc ako Letter from Alan I. Stubin, D e p  
uty Chief, Marine Sciences Section, New York City Department of Environmental Protec- 
tion, to Mark Tedesco, Region I1 Coordinator, Long Island Sound Office 3 (Oct. 25, 1996) 
(on file with author) (current cost and nitrogen riduction estimates are based largely on 
limited pilot scale studies and early cost and efficiency projections). 
340. The construction grants program established under Title I1 of the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. 1281 et seq., provided billions of dollars in grants. It was substantially modified by 
the Clean Water Act amendments of 1987 and the bulk of the fund was used to capitalize 
state revolving loan programs. This was part of a Congressional effort to phase out the grant 
program and to encourage communities to assume more of the burden of funding im- 
provements to local sewage treatment plants. See 133 CONG. REC. S19 (daily ed. Jan.6,1987) 
(remarks of Sen. Mitchell). 
341. Both New York and Connecticut provide low cost loans to localities to finance treat- 
ment plant construction and upgrades. Connecticut also provides grants to cover a portion 
of the costs, usually twenty percent. &PHASE I11 PROPOSAL, supra note 21, at 1415; CCMP, 
supra note 2, at 160-163. While these funds are prioritized to address the most critical mu- 
nicipal sewage needs first, nitrogen removal is only one of the factors considered. 
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level field for trading, but that would be politically difficult, and 
would not necessarily make the trading program fair or efficient. 
Alternatively, one might question whether a trading program is 
warranted where there is a strong regulatory program in which 
standards can be tightened as necessary to accomplish water quality 
goals, and where the government could achieve cost efficiency by 
carefully targeting its funding to dischargers most directly impact- 
ing the Sound and having the best potential to economically re- 
duce substantial levels of nitrogen loadings. 
C. Duration of Credits 
In any trading program the nature and duration of pollution 
credits must be carefully defined. The Clean Air Act specifically 
provides that sulfur dioxide allowances are a limited authorization 
to emit the pollutant and do not constitute a property right;"' a wa- 
ter trading program should contain the same provision. Moreover, 
the exact duration of the credits must be carefully chosen and 
spelled out. In a situation where increasingly stringent limits are to 
be phased in, such as the Title IV acid deposition program, dis- 
chargers might find long-lived credits more attractive than short- 
lived ones since they can bank credits to meet future control re- 
quirements. That is not necessarily the case here. If the 58.5 per- 
cent reduction goal proves sufficient to achieve the desired envi- 
ronmental results, then more stringent limits may be unnecessary. 
Moreover, there is less certainty about future requirements in a wa- 
ter trading program than the Title IV program since the former is 
not specifically enshrined in the federal statute. Congress might 
choose in the next few years to modify the Clean Water Act, poten- 
tially affecting any existing trading program. In addition, it may 
not be wise to allow long term credits if it creates the potential for 
sizable future discharges which could have a deleterious impact on 
water quality. Accordingly, a relatively short credit duration may 
be appropriate, perhaps one year, with a yearly accounting and set- 
tlement of transfers. 
D. Administrative Issues 
One of the major drawbacks of a pollutant trading program is 
the administrative cost entailed with its operation. These rise as 
342. Clean Air Act 5 403(f), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(f). 
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programs become increasingly complicated and hard to adminis- 
ter. It is often difficult to assess costs or to evaluate reductions, and 
no real cost estimates have been prepared for a Long Island Sound 
trading program. Depending on the structure adopted, some en- 
tity must monitor trades, keep records and perhaps provide a bank- 
ing mechanism to support the purchase and sale of credits. Expe- 
rience has shown that credit transactions often have higher 
transaction costs than originally anticipated, particularly if regula- 
tors must validate every trade. If the ecological impact of the pol- 
lutant traded is not similar for all the participating sources, as in 
the present case, the transaction costs can be particularly high."' 
Monitoring can also present a significant cost item, but a thor- 
ough monitoring program is an essential element of a trading pro- 
gram. In this case monitoring would entail extensive water quality 
sampling and analysis to determine the impact of discharges on the 
Sound as a whole, and on local discharge areas. It would also re- 
quire more thorough monitoring of effluent discharges, which may 
vary over time, as well as a strict enforcement regime. The requi- 
site monitoring and enforcement costs are unknown, as is the ques- 
tion of evaluating and avoiding local water impacts. An equally 
important issue is raised by the notorious reluctance of state and 
federal officials to enforce compliance by resistant local govern- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~ ~  Finally, if a banking feature is included in the program, 
the administrative load and the transactions costs are certain to be 
even greater. 
In thinking about these questions we should also keep in mind 
that administrative choices may be strongly influenced by political 
realities. Previous experience with sewage treatment planning has 
shown that local political consideration can "dominate ecological 
343. Tlading in a Long Island Sound program would not be done on a unit for unit basis, 
but would entail calculation of trading ratios. 
344. It was the Long Island Soundkeeper who filed suit under Clean Water Act fj 505 on 
March 9,1998, against the City of New York for failing to achieve compliance at several of its 
plants. The complaint also alleged over 4500 illegal discharges of nitrogen by eight of the 
City's plants over the past two years. Long Island Soundkeeper, et.al. v. New York City Dept. 
of Environmental Protection, No. CV-981635 (E.D. N.Y., filed March 9,1998). The State of 
Connecticut subsequently intervened in the suit, and New York State filed a similar action in 
state court. State of New York v. City of New York, No. 98/400817 (S.Ct. N.Y., filed Mar. 9, 
1998). Scc also David Miller, Nitrogm Ruluction For LIS ChoIlmge4 LISS UPDATE, Fall 1997, at 
2 (noting that New York sewage treatment operaton themselves resist nitrogen removal). 
~nforcement is an area which has presented problems nationwide and connnues to be a 
subject of serious concern.  victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Rum Through It (The Fail- 
ure of Enfmummt in the Clcan Water Act), 25 B.C. E m  AFFAIRS L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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circumstances and technocratic rati~nality."~ 
E. Political Realities 
Any decision to engage in nitrogen trading on the Sound is a po- 
litical as well as an economic iss~e."~ Most POTWs are under the 
control of a local political jurisdiction, generally a town or county. 
Consequently, questions regarding the local jurisdiction's authority 
to spend funds for purchases of credits may arise. Even if the 
authority exists, plant operators may have a preference for engi- 
neering solutions, and may prefer to meet their discharge obliga- 
tions in the traditional manner. 
Provided plant operators conclude that trading is the most bene- 
ficial option, there may be real difficulty in convincing elected offi- 
cials that sending local tax dollars to another jurisdiction is appro- 
priate. Reluctance might be even greater if the purchase were 
made from a private discharger, especially one in another jurisdic- 
tion."' Questions of equity may be raised, since .the areas having 
the most impact on water quality in the Sound are typically more 
aflluent. Would these wealthier counties choose to make the large 
capital investment in new or upgraded facilities; would less pros- 
perous localities choose instead to purchase credits, thereby trans- 
ferring funds to the wealthier jurisdiction? How many jurisdictions 
would choose to make large unmandated capital expenditures in 
the hopes of trading in the future? If credits are given a lengthy 
duration, and freely marketed, how many public officials would ac- 
tually choose to purchase or sell credits for future use, essentially 
speculating with public money? There are no real answers to any 
of these questions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Long Island Sound has been targeted for restoration so that this 
345. Set Latin, Rcgulafoty Failure, supa note 180, at 1656. 
346. As Professor Hahn noted, the choice of a program 'with wonderN efficiency prop 
erties, but which ignores political concerns is likely to remain a theoretical curiosity." 
HAHN, supra note 11, at 18 (discussing the diversity of interest group perspectives and their 
influence on policy choices). 
347. The question becomes even more complicated if the program were expanded to 
include nonpoint sources, since the governmental entities having responsibilities for the 
land areas which are the sources of runoff may not be the same as those having responsibil- 
ity for sewage treatment. 
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resource can remain robust for generations to come. It has been 
determined that nitrogen loadings have been the main culprit con- 
tributing to hypoxic conditions in the Sound, and any program 
that can help redress this problem should be explored. Supporters 
of a nitrogen trading program see it as offering a potentially cost 
effective mechanism to help achieve the necessary reductions. 
However, the program must operate within the context of existing 
laws and policies, with due regard for administrative and political 
realities. Further, in fairness to those facilities which pledge their 
support to achieving the overall reduction goal, any trading pro- 
gram selected must do its best to ensure that the promised eco- 
nomic benefits materialize. 
The Long Island Sound trading proposals pass at least part of 
this litmus test. A trading program could operate within the con- 
straints of the Clean Water Act, through a TMDL process imple- 
mented within the context of the NPDES permit program. It a p  
propriately is limited to a single pollutant, obviously reflects a 
watershed approach to pollution control, and would likely lead to 
enhanced ambient monitoring, thus adhering to the principles 
spelled out by the Environmental Protection Agency for trading 
programs. 
Although previous pollutant trading programs enacted through- 
out the country have not resulted in active markets, we can glean 
from them certain characteristics that appear to contribute to 
overall results. The program should have clear goals, carefully 
spelled out and agreed upon by its participants. A trading baseline 
should be established, optimally in the form of a stringent limit on 
pollutant loadings. That limit should be a market driver and pref- 
erably should decrease over time to accord with Clean Water Act 
goals. Sufficient difference in control costs must exist to provide 
an incentive to trade. The trading participants should be relatively 
homogeneous, and there should be a sufficient level of participa- 
tion to insure a viable market, however, not to the extent that it be- 
comes difficult to identify trading partners and increases transac- 
tion costs. The pollutant traded should be regional in nature, and 
emissions from various sources should have identical impacts on 
the protected resource. Monitoring must be adequate both to in- 
sure against local impacts and to prevent evasion of control limita- 
tions. There must be a credible enforcement program and the po- 
litical will to carry it out. Overall, the program should be as simple 
as possible with low transaction costs. 
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While the exact specifications of a Sound trading program have 
yet to be determined, it does appear to satisfy a number of these 
criteria. The program has a straightforward agreed upon goal, and 
a relatively modest number of potential trading participants with 
uniform types of discharges. Present cost estimates indicate suffi- 
cient disparity in control costs to stimulate a market. The Clean 
Water Act framework contains the mechanisms needed to establish 
the essential requirements for trading: a baseline, along with a 
monitoring and enforcement scheme. Monitoring will, however, 
need to be increased, and careful attention should be given to 
permit drafting, enforcement and citizen participation. 
On the negative side, the use of trading ratios would likely com- 
plicate the process, increasing the complexity of the program and 
presumably adding to administrative burdens and transaction costs. 
The exact extent of this burden cannot be evaluated at the present 
time, and additional work must be done to more firmly fix all cost 
estimates. Determining the actual economic value of the trading 
program is made especially difficult because of the use of govern- 
ment funding, which is a sharp departure from an economist's free 
market ideal. Indeed, it is not clear that a trading program 
achieves any real cost reduction over the traditional regulatory 
program which can mandate pollution reductions and provide 
much of the necessary funds. 
In addition, there remains a substantial possibility of local envi- 
ronmental impacts which increases the need for monitoring and 
raises administrative costs. Also, past experience indicates that en- 
forcement against local entities is likely to be weak. Finally, it re- 
mains to be seen whether municipal officials will be driven by poli- 
tics, rather than economics. 
In the final analysis, a Long Island Sound nitrogen trading pro- 
gram appears, on paper at least, to meet some but not all of the cri- 
teria thought to indicate the potential for a successful trading pro- 
gram. Nevertheless there appears to be strong interest on the part 
of various state and federal officials, and they may determine that it 
is worth proceeding with such a program in spite of the uncertain- 
ties. But judging from experiences with previous market based 
programs, it is entirely possible that even if a nitrogen trading pro- 
gram is established, the amount of trading will be minimal. If that 
is the case, we can only hope that the same phenomenon we wit- 
nessed in other locales occurs on the Sound, with facilities reduc- 
ing their loadings below permitted levels and thus achieving pollu- 
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tion reduction goals despite the lack of trades. If these reductions 
are achieved equitably, and at substantially reduced control costs 
and modest transaction costs then the Sound and the public will 
benefit. Otherwise we may later regard it as an interesting, but 
wasted effort. 
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